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905 
TURNING A SHORT-TERM FLING INTO A LONG-TERM 
COMMITMENT: BOARD DUTIES IN A NEW ERA 
Nadelle Grossman* 
Corporate boards face significant pressure to make decisions that maximize 
profits in the short run. That pressure comes in part from executives who are 
financially rewarded for short-term profits despite the long-term risks asso-
ciated with those profit-making activities. The current financial crisis, where 
executives at AIG and numerous other institutions ignored the long-term risks 
associated with their mortgage-backed securities investments, arose largely 
because those executives were compensated for the short-term profits generat-
ed by those investments despite their longer-term risks. Pressure on boards for 
short-term profits also comes from activist investors who seek to make quick 
money off of trading in stocks whose prices overly reflect short-term firm val-
ues. 
 
Yet this excessive focus on producing short-term profits runs counter to the in-
terests of non-short-termist investors, other corporate constituents, as well as 
our economy and society as a whole in creating corporate enterprises that are 
profitable on an enduring basis. Once again, the current financial crisis pro-
vides a lens through which we can see the distressing impact—both to 
individual businesses as well as to the entire U.S community—of an excessive 
focus on short-term profits. 
 
I propose a solution to address this problem of short-termism. Under my pro-
posal, directors would be required to make decisions that are in the long-term 
best interest of stockholders and the corporation under their fiduciary duties. I 
explain in the Article why I propose fixing the short-termism problem through 
fiduciary duties as well as how, practically, my proposal would be imple-
mented. 
Introduction 
There is significant pressure on boards of directors, both from execu-
tives as well as from investors, to oversee businesses that generate 
profits in the short-term. That often leads to board decisions directed at 
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producing profits over a short period of time, such as six months or a 
year, without regard to the ill effects of those  
decisions on the longer-term health of the business. This tendency to 
manage for the short-term, or “short-termism,” in large part explains the 
near collapse of institutions like AIG and Merrill Lynch that seemed al-
most impregnable not long ago, as these institutions failed to address the 
long-term risks associated with their mortgage-related investments.1 
The pressure from executives on boards is widely believed to be due 
in large part to executive compensation arrangements that reward execu-
tives for short-term profits. Yet executive compensation arrangements 
alone may not explain excessive short-termism by boards. Rather, board 
short-termism also seems to be due to some investors with short invest-
ment horizons who use activism to influence boards to make decisions 
that yield short-term returns despite the longer-term impairing effects 
those decisions might have on the corporate enterprise. 
Yet even with these pressures on boards to create short-term value, a 
director is supposed to have an unyielding fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interest of the entire corporate enterprise of which she is a director.2 
This is reflected in the fiduciary duties every director owes to that corpo-
ration and its stockholders.3 
Thus we must ask—are directors, by furthering the short-term inter-
ests of investors and executives, meeting their fiduciary duties? Or do—
or more importantly, should—fiduciary duties require that they oversee a 
corporation’s affairs with a view to furthering the corporation’s sustained 
success? These are the positive and normative questions I address in this 
Article.4  
While some scholars have focused on the problem of short-termism in 
the modern corporation, many have focused on the market for corporate 
control as the primary source for board short-termism.5 But the wave of 
investor activism that has emerged over the past decade has shown that 
investors are able to influence boards outside of the takeover context, 
and even outside of the stockholder voting franchise. It has also recently 
become apparent that boards have been perpetuating this short-term cor-
                                                     
1. See discussion infra Part II, discussing the role of short-termism in the recent economic 
crisis.  
2. See discussion infra Part III. 
3. See discussion infra Part III. 
4. While this Article focuses on the fiduciary duties of directors, the principles are also ap-
plicable to executive officers, who also have fiduciary duties to the same constituencies as directors. 
See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009) (holding that “corporate officers owe fidu-
ciary duties that are identical to those owed by corporate directors”). 
5. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Gover-
nance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187, 225 (1991) (identifying, as 
the essence of the proposal, “to convert every fifth annual meeting of stockholders into a meaning-
ful referendum on essential questions of corporate strategy and control, and to limit severely the 
ability of stockholders to effect changes in control between quinquennial meetings”).  
Grossman%20Final_C[1]  9/3/2010 2:25 PM 
Summer 2010] Board Duties in a New Era 907 
porate vision by rewarding executives for generating short-term profits 
without regard to the ill effects the efforts that created those profits have 
on the long-term. This, in turn, has created an additional source of pres-
sure on boards to manage for the short-term. Because of these 
developments and the insights gained from them, this Article proposes a 
mechanism to keep directors more focused on long-term profitability 
outside of the takeover context, without requiring significant changes to 
the current scheme of fiduciary duties or necessitating the adoption of 
other significant new laws.6 
This Article also uniquely explains how this duty of directors—to 
generate long-term profits outside of the takeover context—is in the in-
terests of both shareholders and non-shareholder constituents. While 
communitarian scholars have for some time advocated for boards’ con-
sideration of non-shareholder interests in making business decisions, 
they have tended to alienate shareholder primacist scholars, who believe 
that the corporation should be managed for the primary benefit of stock-
holders. This Article bridges the gap between these two groups of 
scholars by explaining how directors’ discharge of their reformulated 
fiduciary duty in the non-takeover context will be in the interest of 
shareholders and other corporate constituents alike. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: 
Part I reviews the sources of short-termism. The discussion includes 
an analysis of how activist investors, particularly hedge funds, influence 
board decisions, exacerbating the board’s focus on the short-term. It also 
examines executive compensation as a source of pressure on boards to 
manage for the short-term. 
Part II reveals why short-termism is bad, not just for individual busi-
nesses, but also for the health of our economy and society. This 
discussion looks at the economic and social costs of short-termism 
through the lens of the recent financial crisis, tracing the roots of that 
crisis to short-termism.  
Part III then examines what it means under current law for directors to 
act “in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders” under 
directors’ fiduciary duties. The discussion reveals that directors have 
                                                     
6. My proposal would complement the proposal recently made by Professors Iman Anabta-
wi and Lynn Stout. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 
60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255 (2008). Under their proposal, every activist investor who has a material, 
pecuniary interest in any matter over which it successfully influences company action (regardless of 
its stock ownership percentage) would have fiduciary duties to other investors similar to those cur-
rently imposed on controlling stockholders. See id. at 1295. However, as they admit, Professors 
Anabtawi’s and Stout’s proposal might not be as usefully applied to address the conflict between 
investors in their investment horizons. See id. at 1290, 1301. My proposal would address this con-
flict by imposing on the board the duty to manage the corporation for the benefit of long-term 
stockholders and other corporate constituents, even where short-term activist investors attempted to 
influence those decisions. 
Grossman%20Final_C[1]  9/3/2010 2:25 PM 
908 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 43:4 
discretion to decide over what time period to look in determining what 
amounts to the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. As I 
argue in this section, this grant of broad discretion leaves directors sus-
ceptible to influence by executives and activist investors for decisions 
that benefit those constituents’ short-term interests, even where that im-
pairs the corporation’s ability to generate profits on a sustainable basis. 
Part IV examines whether it would in fact be in stockholders’ and 
non-stockholder constituents’ best interests for a corporation to be ma-
naged for the long-term, where the board is not faced with a takeover 
decision. As that discussion shows, each of these groups would in fact 
benefit from a corporation being managed with the objective of sustain-
able profitability. 
My proposal, discussed in Part V, would impose on directors the duty 
to act in the long-term best interest of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers where the board is not faced with a takeover proposal. While some 
Delaware courts have expressed a preference for this type of long-term 
standard, they have generally not required it. Instead they have deferred 
to the board to set the time period for realization of corporate profitabili-
ty. My proposal would attempt to eliminate the link between short-
termism and board decisions by eliminating boards’ discretion to make 
decisions aimed solely or even primarily at generating profits in the 
short-term. To comply with this reformulated duty, boards would need to 
consider how the relevant action would impact the corporate enterprise 
in the long-term and only pursue actions that were primarily aimed at 
generating that long-term benefit. This should also lead to decisions that 
are in the interests of both the corporation and its shareholders based on 
Part IV’s revelation that those interests are aligned in the long-term. 
Part VI then concludes. 
I. Sources of Corporate Short-Termism 
This section traces the sources of short-termism in the modern public 
corporation. It begins in Part A by assessing the sources of investor 
short-termism. As Subsection 1 explains, the root of investor short-
termism is the rise of the public corporation and the creation of the stock 
market, which encourages speculative trading by investors. Yet as the 
discussion explains, speculative trading does not itself explain investor 
short-termism, for frequent trading can also mean investors are buying 
stock that undervalues the true value of a firm and selling stock that 
overvalues the true value of a firm—so that the firm’s stock price ulti-
mately reflects its true value. However, as Subsection 2 explains, the 
short-term bias of information that is provided to public company inves-
tors causes those investors to over-value short-term profits at the 
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expense of long-term profits. That means that firms’ true values are 
overly reflective of their short-term values and under reflective of their 
long-term values. Subsection 2 also explains how investor behavior may 
also contribute to this undue focus on short-term profits. 
Because investors do not manage or oversee the operation of the cor-
porations in which they invest, this short-termism might seem to be 
inapposite to the time period over which corporations are managed. But 
as Part B explains, investor short-termism impacts board decisions both 
through the shareholder voting franchise (Subsection 1) as well as 
through investor activism (Subsection 2). 
Part C assesses why executives want boards to be short-termists and 
how they influence boards to pursue their short-term agendas. 
A. Sources of Investor Short-Termism 
Any discussion of why investors are short-termists necessarily begins 
with an understanding of how our stock markets support the speculative 
nature of public company securities. Once we understand the speculative 
nature of public company securities, we can then understand how the 
stock markets cause speculative investors to unduly favor the short-term.  
1. Speculative Nature of Investments in Public Companies 
Use of the corporate form in the U.S. became widespread in the 19th 
century as a result of increasing industrialization.7 Corporations formed 
during that era were largely closely-held corporations in which the stock 
was held by founders, their families and friends and a limited number of 
associates.8 However, starting in the late 19th century and early 20th 
century, the size of corporations grew significantly, largely due to a wave 
of mergers.9 
With this growth in corporate size came a broad expansion in the in-
vestor base.10 As a result, investors held securities not out of an interest 
                                                     
7. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy: How Finance Triumphed Over Indus-
try 8, 11–12 (2008) (describing how the Industrial Revolution led to the growth in size and number 
of corporations, partnerships, and proprietorships and the blossomed use of the business corporation 
starting in the 1840s and 1850s with the expansion of railroads). 
8. Id. at 9. 
9. Id. (describing the wave of mergers from 1897 to 1903 as arising due to the desire to re-
duce competition, create efficiencies in size and management, and generate proceeds from the 
issuance of stock to the public). 
10. Id. at 4 (noting that as a result of the merger wave, middle class investors were drawn to 
the market for the first time and that following the panic of 1907, small investors increased their 
numbers, “pick[ing] among the bargains that were the leavings of the plutocrats”). 
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to finance a particular business, but as a way to make a profit—or for 
speculation.11  
That, in turn, gave rise to the need for a stock market, where investors 
could buy and sell securities to realize the value of their investments.12 
As Berle and Means recognized as early as 1932, investors of public 
companies thus became mere purveyors of capital, having relinquished 
the right to manage physical assets in exchange for liquidity.13  
 Where securities are traded at a higher rate than the period of time 
over which a firm seeks to achieve success, it reveals that investors are 
trading securities to generate profits rather than to finance the underlying 
business—in short, speculating. We can thus see the speculative nature 
of investments in NYSE-listed companies from data from 2006, when 
the turnover rate was 118%.14 That means that on average, every share of 
stock of a NYSE-listed company was traded at least once during the 
year.15 In contrast, the average public company’s life span is more than 
30 years.16 
The rise of the derivatives market seems to have compounded the 
speculative nature of public company investments.17 That is because in-
vestors typically do not hold options or other derivatives for longer than 
nine months.18 Moreover, investors who hold derivative securities are 
typically large institutions that take large positions in those securities.19 
That fact, coupled with the sheer size of the derivatives market, means 
that trades by investors in derivative securities may create movement in 
the price of the underlying security.20 Investors then attempt to profit off 
of these adjustments by increased trading, despite the fact that these ad-
                                                     
11. Id. at 4–5 (describing the evolution of securities held by investors from bonds to preferred 
stock to common stock). 
12. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
5–6 (1933). 
13. Id. at 286. 
14. Mitchell, supra note 7, at 1 (citing John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of 
Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. Acct. & Econ. 3 (2005)). 
15. Undoubtedly some investors traded more than once in 2006 while others held for the en-
tire year. 
16. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
1784, 1788 (2006) (finding that 63% of the Fortune 100 public companies in 2005 had gone public 
before 1975); see also Berle & Means, supra note 12, at 282 (“Today, the life of the investment as 
such is either long, or indefinite, or perhaps perpetual, and the public investor cannot accordingly 
count on the release of his capital through repayment.”); Roger Lowenstein, Go Long, N.Y. Times 
Mag., Jan. 11, 2009, at 9, 9 (“Public-securities markets are a wondrous artifice precisely because 
they offer permanent capital to industry and short-term liquidity to investors.”). 
17. See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: 
Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 137, 176–78 
(1991). 
18. Id. at 165. 
19. Id. at 176. 
20. Id. 
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justments might not reflect any actual change in the business of, or 
available information about, the issuer of the security.21  
While speculation has characterized U.S. publicly traded securities 
since the early 1900s, the speculative nature of equity securities has be-
come more notable with the explosion in the use of hedge funds as 
investment vehicles, as hedge funds often have shorter holding periods 
than other investors. According to one study, hedge funds hold their pub-
lic company investments for an average of one and a half quarters, or 
approximately four and a half months.22 This holding period is much 
shorter than the average seven-quarter holding period for investors on 
the whole.23 One of the oft-cited reasons why hedge funds have shorter 
investment horizons than other investors is the structure of their manag-
ers’ compensation—namely, a large component of hedge fund managers’ 
compensation is tied to total fund profits.24 Managers whose compensa-
tion is tied to fund profits tend to more actively manage their portfolios 
because they constantly seek opportunities to increase their funds’ profits 
through speculative trading in an attempt to increase their compensa-
tion.25 Other factors that might explain hedge funds’ heightened short-
termism include hedge fund managers’ desire to post attractive results to 
raise additional funds,26 as well as fund managers’ ability to act more 
                                                     
21. See id. at 177 (arguing that these adjustments in the price of the underlying security fol-
lowing significant trades in the derivatives market represent a market overreaction). 
22. See Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Hedge Fund Investor Activism and Takeovers 
13 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Papers, Paper No. 08-004, 2007) (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-004.pdf (finding that 
the median position at hedge funds is held for 1.5 quarters); see also Matteo Tonello, The Confe-
rence Bd., Inc., Hedge Fund Activism: Findings and Recommendations for Corporations and 
Investors 11 (2008); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. Rev. 561, 579 (2006); Sebastian Mallaby, Hands Off Hedge Funds, Foreign Aff., Jan.-
Feb. 2007, at 91, 92. But see William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 Geo. 
L.J. 1375, 1413 (2007) (“[T]he activists’ holding record, while not pristine, shows that most commit 
to their targets for at least the intermediate term.”). 
23. See Greenwood & Schor, supra note 22, at 13 (finding that the median position at non-
hedge funds is held for seven quarters). But see Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance 4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Financial Working Paper No. 
139/2006, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=948907 (finding that the median holding period for an activist hedge fund 
that files a Schedule 13D is one year and that analysis of other data suggests hedge funds hold on 
average for closer to 20 months). 
24. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1064 (2007) (stating that hedge fund managers are 
typically paid a percentage of profits earned). 
25. Id. at 1064–65 (arguing that the fact that hedge fund managers are paid a percentage of 
profits earned means that they have a big stake in the success of their funds’ investments). Because 
hedge fund manager compensation is not clawed back due to subsequent losses, there is no incen-
tive to ensure those profits are sustained. Id. at 1064 n.208.  
26. See Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 580 (noting the relationship between hedge funds’ per-
formance and their ability to raise additional funds from the capital markets, and arguing that this 
contributes to a preoccupation with short-term results). 
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nimbly than other investors,27 as hedge funds are typically not regulated 
under the Investment Company Act.28 Moreover, their managers are gen-
erally not regulated under the Investment Advisers Act.29 This absence of 
regulation, including leverage restrictions and reporting requirements, 
allows hedge funds to take larger, less diversified positions in companies 
than can many other institutional investors.30 This flexibility also allows 
them to hedge their risks associated with these investments to a greater 
extent than can other institutional investors.31 The net result is that hedge 
funds can realize larger gains from short-term trades than can more 
heavily regulated, diversified investors. 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, investors tend to hold their public 
company investments for speculative purposes. That means that they 
trade relatively frequently to try to optimize their gains from those in-
vestments. Hedge funds on average trade more frequently than other 
investors for reasons attributed to their unregulated structure. 
Yet public companies do not use a six month, one year, or even two 
year period of time for the appreciation of corporate gains.32 Rather, they 
typically seek to generate profits over a much longer period of time.33 
That goal is apparent from the average life span of the public company, 
which in 2005 exceeded 30 years for the Fortune 100 public compa-
nies.34 It is also clear that public companies are prospectively intended to 
be managed for a longer period of time, for the business plans adopted 
by corporate executives under board oversight typically state firms’ ob-
                                                     
27. SEC, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to the United States Se-
curities and Exchange Commission 33–36 (2003) [hereinafter SEC Report, Hedge Funds] (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
28. Id. at viii-ix, 3; Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1062–63 (noting that while hedge funds 
are not subject to specific regulatory constraints, they must comply with rules applicable to inves-
tors generally, such as disclosure requirements under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
and the short swing profit rules under section 16(b) of that act). The incoming administration has 
suggested that new regulations will be adopted, and in fact some legislation has been proposed, 
requiring hedge funds, private equity funds, and other presently unrelated investment vehicles to 
register with the SEC, maintain records, and comply with disclosure requirements. See Modernizing 
the U.S. Financial Regulatory System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chair, Presidential Recovery 
Advisory Board) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/ 
public/_files/VolckerTestimony2409.pdf. 
29. SEC Report, Hedge Funds, supra note 27, at x, 21, 32. 
30. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1063 (noting that hedge funds can use derivatives to 
accumulate large economic positions without disclosure). 
31. SEC Report, Hedge Funds, supra note 27, at 37–43; Tonello, supra note 22, at 20. 
32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
34. See Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 1788. 
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jectives over the subsequent five-year or longer period.35 In any case, 
even if we assume that businesses seek to be successful over a five-year 
period, that is over twice as long as the period during which investors on 
average hold their shares. That alone might argue in favor of severing 
speculative investors from business decisions, for speculative investors 
would be expected to make or favor decisions that yield returns to them 
over their short holding periods despite the longer time horizons adopted 
on behalf of corporations for the achievement of corporate objectives.36 
Still, the counter-argument is compelling: namely, despite the fact that 
investors have short holding periods, the value of their investments re-
flects not only the short-term value, but also the long-term value, of the 
investee corporation. That is because the stock market is efficient. Thus 
stock prices reflect not simply the value of firms based on anticipated 
returns over any particular investor’s holding period, but indefinitely. 
That means that investors do not necessarily favor decisions that gener-
ate results in the short-term, for the values they place on their 
investments also reflect the profits to be generated in the long-term. I 
will address this argument next.  
2. Short-Term Information Bias 
In a perfectly efficient stock market, stock prices would indeed fully 
reflect the intrinsic values of the firms whose stocks are traded on that 
market.37 To capture a firm’s intrinsic value, a firm’s stock price must 
reflect not only the firm’s value in the short-term, but also its value in 
                                                     
35. See L.J. Bourgeois III et al., Strategic Management: A Managerial Perspective 302 (2d 
ed. 1999) (stating that “[a]ll organizations of any size must plan, and planning tends to [include] . . . 
the development of an overarching five- and ten-year strategic plans”); Fred R. David, Strategic 
Management: Concepts 12–13 (12th ed. 2009) (indicating that strategies, or the means to reach 
objectives, are long-term oriented and typically affect a corporation’s prosperity over the next five 
or more years); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 229 (noting that a standard business plan 
covers five years). 
36. This is not inconsistent with the view that managers, who do make business decisions, 
should hold stock in a firm to have some “skin in the game,” thereby reducing some of the agency 
costs associated with the severance of management from control. President’s Council of Econ. 
Advisers, Economic Organization and Competition Policy, 19 Yale J. on Reg. 541, 548 (2002) 
(noting that paying managers for performance in the form of stock and stock options has become an 
increasingly prominent feature of corporate life, suggesting that it may prove a valuable way for 
shareholders to reduce agency costs). That is because while there is strong support for managers to 
own stock, that stock ownership is generally intended to be a long-term rather than a short-term 
investment. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (describing the current push by the federal 
government to indeed make managers’ stock ownership “long-term” rather than drive them to man-
age for the short-term). 
37. Peter S. Rose, Money and Capital Markets: The Financial System in an Increasingly 
Global Economy 542 (5th ed. 1994); Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 581; Lynn A. Stout, The Mechan-
isms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. Corp. L. 635, 639–41 
(2003). 
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the long-term.38 This theory of the stock market—as being perfectly effi-
cient—is referred to as the efficient capital market hypothesis, or 
ECMH.39 Under the ECMH, if a company’s stock price at any time does 
not fully reflect a proportion of the firm’s true value represented by a 
share of that stock, then investors will buy that firm’s stock (if the stock 
price is lower than the firm’s true value) or sell that firm’s stock (if the 
stock price is higher than the firm’s true value) until the stock price does 
reflect a proportionate share of the firm’s true value. Thus adherents to 
the ECMH hail frequent trading as a mechanism to make the stock mar-
ket more efficient, as each trade causes a firm’s stock price to get closer 
to the firm’s true value.40 
One necessary predicate to the ECMH is the availability to investors 
of all relevant information about a firm, for that is the only way investors 
can know a firm’s true value and determine whether its stock price un-
dervalues or overvalues the firm.41 However, as the Delaware courts 
have recognized, the stock market may not always be efficient.42 Specif-
ically, information about a firm—especially concerning its long-term 
value—may not be “perfect.”43 There are a number of reasons for this. 
For one, it is not necessarily in investors’ interest for information con-
cerning a firm’s long-term value to be publicly disclosed.44 For example, 
if a firm were to publicly disclose what its managers believed was the 
most likely outcome of a lawsuit that has been—or could be—lodged 
against the firm, that information would serve as a cue to the plaintiffs 
and potential plaintiffs as to the existence of such a lawsuit, as well as 
                                                     
38. Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 581 (stating that pursuant to the efficient market theory, an 
investor’s time horizon would not matter since stock prices would reflect long-term values). 
39. Rose, supra note 37, at 542; see also Stout, supra note 37, at 636. 
40. See, e.g., Richard A. Brealey et al., Principles of Corporate Finance 355–58 (9th ed. 
2008) (arguing that arbitrageurs immediately eliminate any discrepancy between stock prices and 
firm values by trading). 
41. Rose, supra note 37, at 542; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms 
of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 551–52 (1984). But see id. at 552 (arguing that “[w]hat 
makes the ECMH non-trivial . . . is its prediction that, even though information is not immediately 
and costlessly available to all participants, the market will act as if it were”). 
42. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670 & 10935, 1989 WL 
79880, at *19 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (“Directors may operate 
on the theory that the stock market valuation is ‘wrong’ in some sense, without breaching faith with 
shareholders. No one, after all, has access to more information concerning the corporation’s present 
and future condition.”); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995) 
(citing Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153). 
43. Moreover, as Professor Lynn A. Stout has argued, a market that is perfect in information 
is not necessarily efficient in determining fundamental value because “[f]irst, arbitrage is not a 
costless process . . . [second, arbitrageurs] enjoy access to only finite amounts of money . . . [third, 
arbitrageurs] are also likely to be risk-averse, . . . [and fourth, arbitrageurs] can only hope to profit 
from their superior information if the rest of the market eventually becomes aware of what the arb 
already knows, and also comes to agree with the arb’s assessment of value.” Stout, supra note 37, at 
655.  
44. See Rose, supra note 37, at 542–43. 
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how much it may be worth.45 Yet failing to have that information would 
impair investors’ ability to value the firm in the long-term—when the 
liability may be realized. 
Another example is that it is generally not in investors’ interest for 
firms to disclose detailed information about future prospects and busi-
ness strategies. For example, if managers disclosed a firm’s marketing 
strategy and identified geographic regions or sectors for growth, that 
information would tip the firm’s hand to its competitors, which could 
enable the competitors to use that information to their advantage. Yet not 
having that information impairs investors’ ability to estimate with any 
accuracy the firm’s future cash flows generated by future sales of those 
products in those regions. That, in turn, impairs their ability to calculate 
the firm’s intrinsic value, as that is typically calculated using an estima-
tion of future cash flows, discounted for the future.46 
In addition, future events and circumstances are often uncertain or 
unknown. Because of that uncertainty, accounting rules tend to underva-
lue “future assets,” or assets which may not be realized for some time. 
For example, firms may not recognize revenue in connection with the 
sale of a good or service until the good or service is delivered, the price 
for the good or service is fixed or determined, and collectability is rea-
sonably assured.47 That means that unless a company publicly announces 
                                                     
45. This is a significant issue under proposed new Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 5, 
which would require disclosure about loss contingencies (including potential lawsuits) that are more 
than “remote” (currently only disclosure is required for “probable” contingent losses). See Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd., Disclosure of Certain Loss Contingencies: An Amendment of FASB 
Statement No. 5 and 141(R) ¶ 5 (Fin. Accounting Series, Exposure Draft File Reference No. 1600-
100, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/ed_contingencies.pdf. In addition, proposed FAS 5 would require firms to 
disclose a description of the factors that are likely to affect the ultimate outcome of that potential 
loss, a qualitative assessment of the most likely outcome, and significant assumptions made in esti-
mating the amounts disclosed. Id. ¶ 7. The American Bar Association has written a letter to the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board emphatically objecting to the proposed changes to this rule 
on the basis that that disclosure would threaten the attorney-client privilege, that there is much un-
certainty in estimating loss contingencies, and that this would create the potential for shareholder 
lawsuits if these estimates turn out to be wrong. See Letter from William H. Neukom, President, 
Am. Bar Ass’n, to Robert H. Herz, Chairman, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., and David Tweedy, 
Chairman, Int’l Accounting Standards Bd. (Aug. 5, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/ 
priorities/privilegewaiver/2008aug5_privwaiv_fasb_l.pdf. 
46. Tim Koller et al., Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies 56 (4th 
ed. 2005). Yet another example, long-recognized by the Delaware courts, is the potential detrimen-
tal impact premature disclosure of a possible sale transaction might have on stockholders. See 
Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 847 n.5 (Del. 1987) (“[T]he effect of premature 
disclosure of merger discussions may be substantial. The probability of completing a merger bene-
fiting all shareholders may well hinge on secrecy during the negotiation process.”). 
47. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,936 (Dec. 9, 1999) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211). In addition, there must be persuasive evidence that an arrangement for the 
sale of the good or service exists. Id. at 68,937. However, SAB 101 has prevented firms from in-
cluding in their financial statements some expected future cash flows, which means that investors 
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a future sale,48 and that information is not otherwise available, investors 
do not factor that information in to their determination of a firm’s intrin-
sic value, again tending to cause that calculation to not capture the value 
of important future assets. 
As another example, accounting rules do not permit firms to include 
the value of their brands or their relationships with suppliers, customers 
and employees in their calculation of intangible assets.49 Moreover, ac-
counting rules require firms to expense research and development 
(R&D) costs as they are incurred instead of permitting firms to capitalize 
those costs over the useful life of the inventions that result from the 
R&D.50 This, then, leads to a reduction in profits for the period in which 
these expenses are incurred without any corresponding increase in as-
sets. While the purpose of this rule may have been to encourage 
investments in R&D,51 in reality this means that current investors shoul-
der the burden of all R&D costs, while they may (or may not) appreciate 
the long-term benefits of those expenditures. This likely explains some 
investors’ reluctance for firms to make investments in R&D.52 Yet in-
                                                     
may get less information about the future cash flows of their investee firms on which to base their 
computations of firm values than they did before SAB 101. Jennifer Altamuro et al., The Effects of 
Accelerated Revenue Recognition on Earnings Management and Earnings Informativeness: Evi-
dence from SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 80 Acct. Rev. 373, 375–76 (2005). Several trade 
groups, recognizing the importance of non-financial disclosure as to future expectations, have pro-
posed increasing these types of disclosure. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Certified Public Acct., The 
Enhanced Business Reporting Framework (October 10, 2005), 
http://www.ebr360.com/downloads/ebr.framework. 
publicexposure.2005.10.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (de-
scribing a framework to encourage companies to report extra-financial matters). 
48. Firms are only required to announce future sales on a Current Report on Form 8-K where 
they will be made pursuant to a material contract. See Rule 13a-11 under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a–11 (2008) [hereinafter Exchange Act]; SEC, Form 8-K § 1.01 (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf. 
49. Comm. for Econ. Dev., Built to Last: Focusing Corporations on Long-Term Performance 
4 (2007); Matteo Tonello, The Conference Bd., Inc., Revisiting Stock Market Short-Termism 28–29 
(2006). 
50. See Tonello, supra note 49, at 28–29 (arguing that current financial reporting principles 
operate as a disincentive to invest in research, innovation, and other drivers of value because in-
vestments in intangibles are expensed, not capitalized, like those on physical and financial assets); 
see also Enzo Baglieri et al., Evaluating Intangible Assets: The Measurement of R&D Performance 
2–3 (SDA Bocconi Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01/49, 2001) (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=278260 (noting that because of the high degree of uncertainty surrounding 
R&D activities, the difficulty in measuring the value of the output of R&D and the dependency on 
other corporate functions, R&D has always been treated as an expense center). 
51. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 
775, 793 (2008) (explaining the justification for the rule that R&D may be expensed as incurred, 
instead of capitalized, as the encouragement of new research and development activity and stimula-
tion of economic growth and technological development). 
52. See Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 580 (arguing that stock prices can temporarily be in-
creased by increasing short-term earnings by, for example, cutting research and development 
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tangible assets may comprise a significant part of a corporation’s intrin-
sic value.53 That means that financial statements may not accurately 
capture one of the key drivers of future cash flows, which again, are typ-
ically used to calculate a firm’s intrinsic value.54 
Moreover, some commentators believe that investors tend to overly 
discount the value of future returns, even when they are disclosed.55 This 
is undoubtedly due in large part to the unreliability of a future stream of 
cash flows.56 While investors cannot be blamed for the tendency to rely 
on more certain historical information rather than uncertain statements 
as to the future, it further  
explains why a firm’s stock price might not accurately depict the long-
term value of a firm even as to information as to future assets, liabilities, 
and risks that is disclosed. 
The fact that accounting rules, and the financial statements prepared 
employing those rules, fail to capture the value of firms’ long-term assets 
and liabilities has significant implications, for a number of studies have 
found that investors tend to rely heavily, if not entirely, on financial 
statements in making their investment decisions.57 That means that in-
                                                     
expenses or capital expenditures); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 210 (arguing that manag-
ers seeking to satisfy the short-term expectations of institutional investors sacrifice investments for 
the future, such as research and development and capital expenditures). But see Koller et al., supra 
note 46, at 80–81 (arguing that stock markets reward R&D and advertising expenditures even 
though those expenditures may negatively affect short-term earnings); Kahan & Rock, supra note 
24, at 1085–87 (noting the active debate as to whether the stock market undervalues long-term 
investments relative to short-term investments and the lack of clear empirical evidence showing that 
capital markets are not efficient). 
53. See Baruch Lev, Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting 77 (2001); Bag-
lieri et al., supra note 50, at 2 (arguing that intangible assets are increasingly considered the ultimate 
roots of a company’s success). 
54. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
55. Anabtawi, supra note 22, at 581 (“Numerous studies have shown that the stock market 
places a disproportionately high value on a company’s near-term earnings by placing an excessively 
high discount rate on its future expected earnings.”); Hazen, supra note 17, at 181 (“There is consi-
derable evidence that stock prices do not accurately discount the future.”); Wayne Joerding, Are 
Stock Prices Excessively Sensitive to Current Information?, 9 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 71, 72 (1988) 
(arguing that stock markets are overly sensitive to short run factors). But see George Loewenstein & 
Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, 107 Q.J. Econ. 
573, 573–97 (1992) (arguing that investors use “hyperbolic discounting”; in other words, they de-
crease their degree of discounting with respect to pay-outs over long time horizons). 
56. Berle & Means, supra note 12, at 320 (“[A]nd it is not easy, if indeed, it is possible at all, 
to disclose anything other than that which has actually occurred.”). This is exemplified by the in-
crease in stock price caused by the recognition of revenues in a current period instead of a future 
period. With the large number of restatements, perhaps investors are also discounting the value of 
past results. 
57. See Comm. for Econ. Dev., supra note 49, passim (noting that emphasis on quarterly 
earnings, compensation tied to earnings per share, shortened CEO tenures, and financial reports that 
fail to adequately inform about company performance impede the task of building long-term value; 
and arguing that the false precision of financial statements feeds the focus by managers, traders, and 
analysts on earnings per share); Tonello, supra note 49, at 8 (citing a study by the U.S. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Duke University, and University of Washington, finding that a ma-
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vestors overly rely on short-term financial metrics in determining firms’ 
intrinsic values. Investor determination of firm values from short-term 
financial metrics undoubtedly leads to a determination that is overly rep-
resentative of a firm’s value in the short-term. 
Still, some investors, particularly professional managers, do try to ad-
just for some of the shortcomings of financial statement disclosures in 
determining a firm’s intrinsic value.58 Yet not all investors have the re-
sources available to do so.59 That means that different investors calculate 
a firm’s intrinsic value differently, leading to stock trades that cause a 
firm’s stock price to bounce around between different perceived intrinsic 
values. And even the investors who do adjust for financial statement 
shortcomings must do so extrapolating longer-term values from informa-
tion that is disclosed and that has a short-term bent. That, too, would 
seem to impair their ability to accurately determine a firm’s intrinsic 
value. 
Moreover, even a shareholder who can “accurately” calculate a firm’s 
intrinsic value might still prefer decisions that yield short-term profits 
knowing that other investors place increased weight on that in determin-
ing intrinsic value.60 
Investors’ over-reliance on short-term financial metrics in determining 
firms’ intrinsic values is exacerbated by firms’ public release of guidance 
as to expected earnings during the subsequent quarter. Where a corpora-
tion issues quarterly earnings guidance, management often feels pressure 
to meet or beat that guidance for fear of disappointing investors whose 
expectations were set by that guidance, as disappointed investors tend to 
punish a corporation through selling its stock.61 Consequently, pressure 
                                                     
jority of companies view financial indicators based on earnings (especially earnings-per-share) as a 
key metric of performance). 
58. See Brealey et al., supra note 40, at 338 (stating that before applying any accounting 
measure of performance, one must make “major adjustments to the income statement and balance 
sheets”). 
59. See Stout, supra note 37, at 653 (indicating that studies suggest that where information is 
technical and difficult to understand, stock prices do not quickly adjust to reflect it). But see Gilson 
& Kraakman, supra note 41, at 565–67 (arguing that different market mechanisms operate to cause 
the stock market to reflect new information, even information that is only available to a few traders, 
though noting that information that is less available requires more time to become reflected in stock 
price). Even if we assume that all information eventually reaches investors, given the high turnover 
rate of stocks, undoubtedly many investors are trading before relevant information reaches them.  
60. See Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Spe-
culative Markets, 73 Rev. Econ. Stud. 577, 578 (2006) (arguing that “overconfidence provides a 
source of heterogeneous beliefs among investors, which lead them to speculate against each other”). 
61. See Comm. for Econ. Dev., supra note 49, at 5 (revealing evidence which shows that 
firms that issue quarterly earnings guidance attract more transient investors and have higher trading 
volumes than companies that do not issue earnings guidance); John R. Graham et al., The Economic 
Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. Acct. & Econ. 3, 67 (2005) (noting that a 
majority of the over 400 chief financial officers surveyed “admit[ted] to sacrificing long-term eco-
nomic value to hit a target or to smooth short-term earnings”); David Millon, Why Is Corporate 
Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 Geo. 
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to meet investors’ expectations set through earnings guidance may cause 
managers to manage with the goal of keeping a firm’s stock price high, 
notwithstanding the impairing effect that might have on long-term cor-
porate performance.62 For example, it might lead managers to forego 
incurring R&D expenses and hiring of new employees, simply to ensure 
projections are met.63 It might also lead to the temptation to manage 
earnings to maintain consistent, positive numbers.64 While there is sup-
port from some in the business and investment communities to curb the 
issuance of quarterly earnings guidance,65 approximately half of all pub-
lic corporations still provide this type of guidance.66  
Still other market imperfections associated with investor behavior that 
tend to cause a short-term bias can be identified in the rubble of the cur-
                                                     
Wash. L. Rev. 890, 892 (2002) (finding that “[c]ompanies falling short [of analyst earnings targets] 
by even a penny per share can see an immediate plunge of 25 percent or more [in their stock 
price]”). 
62. See, e.g., Comm. for Econ. Dev., supra note 49, at 5 (“Most observers view company 
forecasts of quarterly changes in earnings per share, and market reliance on those forecasts, as 
among the primary causes of short-term behavior—possibly including aggressive accounting by 
some companies to ‘make their numbers,’ or postponement of valuable long-term investments.”); 
Mitchell, supra note 7, at 1 (“A recent survey of more than four hundred chief financial officers of 
major American corporations revealed that almost 80 percent of them would have at least moderate-
ly mutilated their businesses in order to meet analysts’ quarterly profit estimates.”). 
63. See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 1 (“Cutting the budgets for research and development, ad-
vertising and maintenance and delaying hiring and new projects are some of the long-term harms 
they would readily inflict on their corporations.”); see also Millon, supra note 61, at 893. 
64. Millon, supra note 61, at 897. It might also lead to decisions such as layoffs to bump up a 
corporation’s stock price in the near term. See also Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a 
New Gilded Age, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 12 (2008) (describing the “seven percent rule” preva-
lent during the wave of downsizings in the 1990s—and seemingly still applicable today—in which a 
firm’s announcement of mass layoffs leads to a 7% jump in its stock price, and indicating that re-
cent research shows that the long-term effect of these downsizing efforts on stock price is at least 
unclear and may be negative). 
65. See, e.g., Comm’n on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Mkts. in the 21st Century, Report 
and Recommendations 7 (2007) [hereinafter 21st Century] (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http:// 
www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/eozwwssfrqzdm3hd5siogqhp6h2ngxwdpr77qw2bogptzvi5weu
6mmi4plfq6xic7kjonfpg4q2bpks6ryog5wwh5sc/0703capmarkets_full.pdf (promoting the elimina-
tion of quarterly earnings per share guidance and the promulgation by public companies of more 
information about their long-term business strategies and material developments between quarterly 
announcements of actual earnings). But see Disclosure Advisory Board Responds to Chamber of 
Commerce Recommendations on Earnings Guidance, PR Newswire, Mar. 21, 2007, 
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/ 
www/story/03-21-2007/0004550656&EDATE= (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform) (arguing that eliminating quarterly earnings guidance is too sweeping, and favoring a 
balancing of short-term and long-term guidance relative to qualitative and quantitative measures). 
66. Comm. for Econ. Dev., supra note 49, at 5. Proponents of the practice argue that (1) the 
practice is necessary to keep analysts’ earnings forecasts within a reasonable range, (2) successful 
forecasts increase stockholder confidence in management, and (3) good guidance decreases infor-
mation asymmetries between management and investors. See Joel F. Houston et al., To Guide or Not 
to Guide? Causes and Consequences of Stopping Quarterly Earnings Guidance 2 (NYU Stern Sch. 
of Bus. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2451/27472, 2008) (on file with the University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1280693. 
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rent financial crisis, where investors seemed to all but ignore the risks—
even those that were disclosed—about the potential collapse of the hous-
ing market.67 For example, it is arguable that investors were caught up in 
the euphoria of the housing bubble, leading them to ignore, or choose to 
not understand, what they were buying.68 Under this premise, informa-
tion as to long-term risks, while disclosed, was simply ignored.69 
Another explanation is that investors were simply following the herd, 
buying securities that everyone else was buying.70 Thus investors got 
caught up in the stampede to buy securities notwithstanding the dis-
closed long-term risks of those securities.71 Still another explanation for 
investors’ failure to perceive the risks of a financial collapse can be attri-
buted to investors’ tendency to over-identify with events that they were 
familiar with (increases in the prices of mortgage-related securities) and 
believed them likely to continue.72 Each of these types of investor beha-
vior can explain why investors choose to ignore, or fail to appreciate, 
long-term risks, even when they are disclosed.73 Thus these, too, might 
explain why investors focus on short-term profits generated by their in-
vestments notwithstanding the longer-term risks associated with the 
business strategies of those firms. 
3. Summary 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the lack of public disclosure as to 
the value of future assets and future sources of cash flows, as well as 
future risks and liabilities, leads investors to undervalue those long-term 
assets, liabilities, and risks in determining the intrinsic values of public 
firms. While some investors can more accurately determine the intrinsic 
value of a firm due to their sophistication and resources, their ability to 
do so is undoubtedly impaired by the lack of information they receive as 
to long-term values. And even investors who can more accurately com-
pute a firm’s intrinsic (including long-term) value may place a higher 
                                                     
67. See Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets 2–5, 10–16 (2000) (arguing that behavioral 
finance shows that many investors act irrationally and this is not corrected through arbitrage activi-
ty). 
68. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 373, 382 (2008). 
69. Yet some investors may have rationally decided to ignore information as to long-term 
risks, believing that they could ride out the bubble and sell their securities before the housing market 
crashed.  
70. Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 382. 
71. Still some investors may have rationally decided to get caught up in the herd, again on the 
assumption that they could sell their securities before the housing market crashed. 
72. Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 382–83. 
73. Investors might also ignore disclosure where they can defer to more easily interpreted in-
vestment signals such as rating agencies’ securities ratings. Id. at 382. 
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value on short-term performance indicators, knowing that is how other 
investors value a firm. In any case, their trades would not necessarily 
cause a firm’s stock price to approach a true value which appropriately 
includes the long-term value of that firm. Other investors also trading in 
that firm’s securities who do not have the sophistication and resources 
needed to calculate a firm’s long-term value would be trading using a 
value that gives priority to the shorter-term value of the firm. Moreover, 
as behavioral economics instructs, some investors may fail to appreciate, 
or may choose to ignore, the long-term risks of their investments. That, 
again, can cause a short-term bias in investor behavior, altering the long-
er-term focus that might prevail in a perfect market. 
Still, even with these market imperfections favoring short-term in-
vestment profits, many investors’ investment strategy is to hold stock for 
a long period of time.74 Moreover, some large institutions are long-term 
investors by necessity, for due to their sheer size, they will inevitably 
end up holding positions in the same firms in the future.75 Yet the exis-
tence of investor short-termism argues in favor of exercising caution 
when considering whether to implement investors’ recommendations and 
demands in relation to how to manage the corporation, particularly 
where those demands are made by investors who are known to have 
short investment horizons. 
B. Investor Short-Termism Impacts Board Decisions 
The fact that investors desire short-term results does not necessarily 
translate into firms that are managed for the short-term. That is because 
directors oversee the business and affairs of the corporations on whose 
boards they serve.76 On that basis alone it would seem that boards should 
be impervious to investors’ demands for short-term results. Yet there are 
a number of reasons why boards are short-termists as a result of this in-
vestor short-termism. Subsection 1 examines how investors affect board 
decisions through the shareholder franchise. Subsection 2 then explores 
how investors have started to influence board decisions through targeted 
activism. 
                                                     
74. See Charles Luftig, Note, Considered Action, Unconsidered Result: Why the Tax Relief 
Act of 2003 Could Put Retirement Savings at Greater Risk, 23 Va. Tax Rev. 701, 711 (2004) (noting 
that 96% of the equity investors surveyed described themselves as adhering to long-term investment 
strategies). 
75. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 216–17 (“[T]he large institutional stockholder 
is a long-term investor in the market as a whole. Unless it divests itself of equities altogether, it will 
have an equity stake in a substantial portfolio of corporations regardless of how long it maintains a 
stake in any one corporation.”). 
76. See discussion infra Part III. 
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1. Short-Term Investors Influence Board Decisions 
Through the Voting Franchise 
Investors elect directors, typically on an annual basis.77 The right to 
elect directors gives investors significant power over boards, for it 
means that ultimately, boards must be accountable to investors for their 
actions. That, in turn, means that directors must to an extent oblige in-
vestors’ wishes, including their wishes for short-term profits, if the 
directors want to be reelected. 
Yet there are many who challenge the effectiveness of this accounta-
bility mechanism, not only because the board, typically through a 
nominating committee, decides which candidates to nominate on behalf 
of the company, but also because it is typically only those candidates 
who are included in the company’s proxy statement.78 Thus the solicita-
tion of proxies for any competing slate of directors must generally be 
paid for by the investor putting forth the competing slate.79 
Still, the risk of non-reelection is becoming much more of a reality as 
investors increasingly use the threat of a proxy contest to get their direc-
tor nominees on the company’s slate of directors.80 This threat 
increasingly has teeth as investors have started to propose bylaws requir-
ing the reimbursement by a company of its stockholders’ expenses in 
successfully soliciting proxies in favor of a competing slate of direc-
tors.81 Under a new rule proposed by the SEC, which many expect to 
                                                     
77. While the default rule is that directors must be elected every year, in a corporation that 
has a staggered board, directors only stand for election every two or three years, depending on 
whether the corporations’ board is staggered in two or three tiers. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 141(d) (2001). However, the staggered board structure is disappearing, in large part due to inves-
tor pressure to avoid director entrenchment. Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for 
Shareholder Democracy, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 53, 71 (2008) (citing studies that show that by the end of 
2006, a majority of the S&P 500 companies’ directors were to have been elected every year); Mira 
Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered Boards?, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 149, 155–56, 185, 187 
(2008). 
78. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 Va. L. Rev. 675, 680, 
688–95 (2007) (noting the importance of the shareholder franchise and arguing that legal and prac-
tical impediments impair shareholders’ ability to exercise that franchise to replace the board). 
79. Id. at 688–91. 
80. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
81. See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229–30 (Del. 
2008) (describing a stockholder-proposed bylaw amendment that would require the company to 
reimburse the proxy solicitation expenses of a stockholder who has at least one of its directors 
elected to the board in a contested election). According to the Delaware Supreme Court in 
AFSCME, these types of bylaws are permissible so long as they preserve for the board the discretion 
to deny reimbursement where doing so is necessary for the board to comply with its fiduciary du-
ties. Id. at 239–40. The new e-proxy rules and 1990 proxy rule amendments also make it easier, and 
less expensive, for shareholders to solicit proxies for competing slates of directors. Richard Morri-
sey, Sullivan & Cromwell L.L.P., Proxy Solicitation Through the Internet, in Seventh Annual 
Institute on Securities Regulation in Europe: A Contrast in EU and U.S. Provisions 583, 585 (PLI 
Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1643, 2008); see also Rule 14a-1(l)(2) under 
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pass in some form,82 companies will not be able to exclude these types 
of proposals from their proxy statements.83 Stockholders will undoubted-
ly propose more competing slates where their costs in doing so are 
covered by the company. In addition, under the SEC’s proposed rule, 
stockholders holding a specified number of shares for the specified pe-
riod of time will be able to include one or more director nominees on the 
company’s proxy statement, also making a contested election more like-
ly.84 Investors have also been increasing their say over board 
composition through provisions of the bylaws or corporate policies, 
adopted by many companies at the behest of stockholders, which call for 
the resignation of any director not receiving the support of a majority of 
stockholders.85 This, too, has heightened the level of accountability of 
directors to stockholders as directors face a greater likelihood of being 
forced to resign.  
Outside of the director election context, stockholders have been in-
cluding “say on pay” proposals—or proposals requesting that the board 
obtain an advisory vote from the stockholders indicating whether they 
approve or disapprove of management’s compensation packages—on 
company proxy statements.86 These types of proposals are useful in that 
they afford stockholders a way to collectively make recommendations to 
management without forcing them to pay for the solicitation of proxies 
in support of the proposal. However, because management may exclude 
from the company’s proxy statement any proposal that would be impro-
                                                     
the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(2) (2008); Rule 14a-2(b)(1) under the Exchange Act, id. 
§ 240.14a-2(b)(1); Rule 14a-16 under the Exchange Act, id. § 240.14a-16.  
82. See, e.g., Jeffrey McCracken & Kara Scannell, Fight Brews as Proxy-Access Nears, Wall 
St. J., Aug. 26, 2009, at C1. 
83. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 
18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274). 
84. See id. 
85. See Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to 
Creditors, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1386 (2007) (“At the start of 2005, fewer than thirty of the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 had bylaws or policies requiring a majority voting standard. By early 2006, 
this figure had increased to roughly 145.”); see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, 
Majority Voting for the Election of Directors, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 459, 473 (2007); Vincent Falcone, 
Note, Majority Voting in Director Elections: A Simple, Direct, and Swift Solution?, 2007 Colum. 
Bus. L. Rev. 844, 860 (2007).  
86. See SEC, Division of Corporation Finance: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A (2002) (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14a.htm (indicating the SEC’s position as to which “say on 
pay” proposals are excludable and which are not under Rule 14a-8); Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay 
and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law and CEO Compensation, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 207, 219 
(2008). Congress has recently passed legislation that will give investors of public companies that 
receive funds under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)—established under the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008—a say on pay, and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has recently passed a rule implementing this legislative mandate. See American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (2009); Shareholder Vote on 
Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007); Rule 14a-20 under the Exchange 
Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-20 (2010). 
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per under state law or that relates to a company’s “ordinary business op-
erations,”87 shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 have historically 
been limited to matters of corporate governance or social responsibility 
proposals that do not affect the corporation as a profit-making institu-
tion, and have often taken the form of precatory—or non-binding—
proposals.88 Again, Rule 14a-8 is likely to become much more important 
to stockholders with respect to the election of directors if the SEC’s pro-
posed rule described above passes. 
Investors also have the right to vote on certain significant transac-
tions. These transactions include mergers, sales of all or substantially all 
of firms’ assets and dissolutions.89 That means that boards may not pur-
sue these types of transactions without shareholder support, and in that 
way, are held accountable to stockholders. Perhaps more importantly, 
any board decision to  
implement defenses to a takeover offer must meet higher-than-normal 
fiduciary duty standards.90 
Yet these voting rights do not give shareholders the power to initiate 
these types of takeover transactions. Rather, they must be approved by 
the board, who then must submit the transaction to the stockholders for 
approval.91 Stockholders do, however, have the right to initiate a sale of 
their stock, either in a stand-alone transaction or to an acquirer through a 
collective tender offer. This is undoubtedly one of the most important 
tools stockholders have traditionally used to keep boards in line with 
their interests, for it allows stockholders to vote against the board by us-
ing their feet.92 Still, boards have traditionally employed any number of 
defenses to either prevent or make more difficult takeovers via tender 
offers. These defenses include the poison pill,93 golden parachute pay-
                                                     
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1), (7) (2008). 
88. See SEC, Division of Corporation Finance: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14, at 27 (2001) (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/cfslb14.pdf (“In our experience, we have found that proposals that are bind-
ing on the company face a much greater likelihood of being improper under state law and, therefore, 
excludable under rule 14a-8(i)(1).”); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 
Mich. L. Rev. 520, 541 (1990). 
89. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271, 275 (2001). 
90. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985) (set-
ting forth an “enhanced duty” before the business judgment rule is applied to a board’s decision to 
adopt defensive measures in response to a takeover offer “[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that 
a board may be acting primarily in its own interests”). 
91. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271, 275. 
92. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
407, 409, 425 (2006) (arguing that the right to sell shares is one of the most fundamental rights of 
shareholders because it allows shareholders to obtain the economic benefits from their investments 
and allows shareholders to exit if they become dissatisfied with management). 
93. A poison pill is a device through which current stockholders, excluding the attempting 
acquirer, receive the right to convert a security into additional shares of stock at an extreme dis-
count, thereby making the takeover significantly more expensive for the acquirer. See 1 Dennis J. 
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ments to executives,94 and a staggered board structure.95 Moreover, De-
laware, like many other states, has an anti-takeover statute that deters 
takeovers structured as tender offers.96 Still, many of these board-
adopted defensive measures are in decline as these measures are per-
ceived as simply ways to entrench boards, rather than mechanisms 
boards may use to protect investors from coercive and inadequate takeo-
ver offers.97 Golden parachutes have been especially susceptible to 
challenge as pressure mounts on boards to tie manager compensation to 
long-term performance.98 In any event, it would be unduly simplistic to 
assume that directors always seek to avoid a takeover due to their self-
interest in remaining as directors. In fact, with the current wave of pres-
sure on directors to hold stock and have some “skin in the game,” it may 
be in directors’ interests to consummate a takeover to realize the value of 
their stock holdings. 
Even without an actual takeover offer, the mere possibility that a po-
tential acquirer will make an unwanted offer undoubtedly keeps boards 
accountable to stockholders.99 This is typically manifested through board 
actions aimed at maintaining a high stock price, thereby making it less 
likely that an acquirer can offer an attractive control premium to the 
shareholders.100  
                                                     
Block et al., The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors 1085–91 (5th 
ed. 1998). The Delaware courts more highly scrutinize these types of defensive measures, particu-
larly when they are taken in the face of a pending takeover offer, than they do other business 
decisions. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. Recently a number of stockholders have proposed 
bylaw amendments which require stockholder approval before the board can renew a poison pill. 
See Victor Lewkow & Sarah ten Siethoff, The Embattled Poison Pill, in Contests for Corporate 
Control 2007: Current Offensive & Defensive Strategies in M&A Transactions 403, 405 (PLI Cor-
porate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1584, 2007).  
94. This defense triggers a large balloon payment to certain executive officers upon a change 
in control, thus making the acquisition more expensive. 1 Block et al., supra note 93, at 1296–98. 
95. This type of “shark repellant” makes it impossible to replace the entire board at a single 
annual stockholders meeting. Id. at 1246, 1249, 1278–83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the decline in popularity of the staggered board structure. 
96. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203. 
97. See Jim Mallea, M&A Year End Review, FactSet Mergers, Jan. 23, 2009, 
https://www.factsetmergers.com/marequest?an=dt.getPage&st=1&pg=/pub/rs_20090122.html&rnd
=970861 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting the six-year trend 
towards decreasing takeover defenses). But see id. (noting the surge in pill adoptions late in 2008 
leading to the highest annual rate of pill adoptions since 2002, and arguing that this is likely related 
to the precipitous drop in valuations and increased risk of takeovers rather than a sea change in the 
current thinking on poison pills). 
98. See 1 Block et al., supra note 93, at 1298 (explaining the many grounds on which golden 
parachutes have been criticized and noting they are often de minimus in comparison to the deal 
size); see also discussion infra note 142 and accompanying text (explaining how recent laws restrict 
the payment of golden parachutes by companies receiving funds from the U.S. Treasury). 
99. See Hazen, supra note 17, at 182. 
100. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. Fin. Econ. 
409, 410–11 (2005); Hazen, supra note 17, at 182. 
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Finally, stockholders have the right to approve amendments to a 
firm’s charter submitted to them by the board, as well as the right to 
amend the bylaws without director action.101 Stockholders have actually 
been increasingly using the right to amend the bylaws to give themselves 
a more effective voice in the election of directors.102 While bylaws only 
define the processes and procedures by which board decisions are 
made,103 it is clear that regulating those processes and procedures can 
have a significant impact on the substance of the decisions made using 
them.104 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, shareholders may hold directors 
accountable to their interests through their statutory voting rights. Most 
importantly, shareholders have the right to elect directors, which is be-
coming increasingly effective as a result of majority vote bylaws as well 
as reforms aimed at increasing the likelihood of a contested director 
election. Shareholders also have the right to approve many significant 
transactions. These accountability mechanisms allow stockholders to 
influence board decisions. Still, these accountability mechanisms typi-
cally require the vote of a majority of shareholders for success. That 
means that they are less useful to minority investors seeking to indivi-
dually influence board actions. That, perhaps, explains the rise of the 
non-voting channels of influence discussed next. 
2. Short-Term Investors Influence Board Decisions Outside of the 
Voting Franchise—Modern Trends in Activism 
The foregoing discussion does not reveal the true extent of investor 
influence on boards, for it depicts investors who are limited in their 
mode of influence to the stockholder voting franchise. But this is no 
longer true, particularly in the wave of activism that has emerged follow-
ing the numerous collapses of the early 21st century, where many boards 
                                                     
101. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(a); see also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension 
Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 (Del. 2008) (holding that the stockholders’ power to amend the bylaws 
cannot be non-consensually eliminated or limited by anyone other than the legislature). 
102. See, e.g., AFSCME, 953 A.2d at 229–30; supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
103. See id. at 234–35 (“It is well-established Delaware law that a proper function of bylaws is 
not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to 
define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made.”).  
104. For example, as the Delaware Supreme Court noted in AFSCME, stockholders may adopt 
a bylaw requiring the reimbursement of any stockholder for its proxy expenses incurred in conduct-
ing a successful competing proxy solicitation, as that primarily relates to the process for the election 
of directors; provided that, as was not the case with the AFSCME-proposed bylaw, the board retains 
the authority to deny such reimbursement where to do so would be required by their fiduciary du-
ties. Id. at 234–40. 
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were perceived as having failed to actively oversee the corporations un-
der their charge.105 
In this new era of activism, investors influence boards directly, with-
out involving other stockholders. Some of the mechanisms employed by 
investors to influence boards include demand letters sent to the board,106 
often made public through the filing of the letter on a Schedule 13D,107 
and publicity campaigns.108 Investors have also been using the threat of a 
proxy contest to obtain board concessions, often leading the board to 
include the threatening investor’s candidates in the slate of directors no-
minated by the board.109 
Through these informal channels, some investors have been expand-
ing their scope of influence beyond matters on which they have a voting 
right. These investors, especially hedge funds, now commonly seek to 
influence boards on ordinary business decisions, such as the sale of dor-
mant assets or lines of business,110 the decrease of capital 
expenditures,111 and the payment of dividends or repurchase of shares.112 
                                                     
105. But see April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds 
and Other Private Investors 10 (NYU Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-41, 
2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=913362 (noting that institutional investors began to seek changes using informal 
communications starting in the 1980s, but these efforts had little impact on firm performance or 
stock price). 
106. See e.g., The Children’s Investment Master Fund Urges CSX to Take Immediate Action to Im-
prove Corporate Governance and Business Performance, Bus. Wire, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www. 
businesswire.com/news/home/20071016005752/en/Childrens-Investment-Master-Fund-Urges-CSX-
Action (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (including a letter from The 
Children’s Investment Master Fund to the CSX board calling for the CSX board to separate the chairman 
and CEO roles and align management compensation with shareholder interests, among other things). 
107. See, e.g., CNET Networks, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D), at  
7–9 (Dec. 26, 2007) (filed by JANA Partners LLC) (disclosing a letter revealing JANA’s  
intention to increase CNET’s board size and to solicit proxies in favor of JANA’s nominees). 
108. See, e.g., Press Release, Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., Pershing Square Capital 
Management Announces Public Presentation on Target Corporation on Wednesday, October 29, 
2008 (Oct. 28, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://www.smartbrief.com/news/aaaa/industryPR-detail.jsp?id= 
88A02468-EFC6-4FC9-A425-E2D675E9154A; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1029. 
109. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1029; see also Klein & Zur, supra note 105, at 67. 
110. See e.g., Kerr McGee Corp., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D), at sched. A 
(Mar. 3, 2005) (filed by Icahn Partners L.P.) (describing Icahn’s demand that the Kerr McGee board 
repurchase stock, sell the chemical unit and lock in oil prices on future production). 
111. See, e.g., Applebee’s Int’l, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D/A, Amend. 
No.1), at exhibit B (Dec. 11, 2006) (filed by Breeden Capital Mgmt. LLC) (describing Breeden 
Capital’s demands on Applebee’s board that they decrease capital expenditures). 
112. See, e.g., Brooks Automation, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D/A, 
Amend. No.7), at exhibit 1 (Sep. 26, 2007) (filed by The D3 Family Fund, L.P.) (disclosing a letter 
from investor David Nierenberg to Robert Lepofsky, the chief executive officer of Brooks Automa-
tion, demanding that Brooks Automation repurchase shares of its stock over the next 3–4 years). 
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They also seek to influence board decisions as to potential takeovers be-
fore stockholders have the right to vote on the transaction.113 
Based on the impact they have had on firms, some of these activist ef-
forts appear designed to deliver a short-term spike in stock price. This is 
supported by the results of a study conducted by April Klein and Ema-
nuel Zur in which they found that while the stock prices of the targets of 
hedge fund activism were abnormally high throughout the year follow-
ing activism,114 there was no evidence that those targets in fact became 
more profitable one year following the activism.115 On the contrary, they 
found a deterioration in those firms’ profitability one year following the 
activism.116 Other studies and reports have found similar, deleterious 
long-term effects of this type of activism on public corporations.117 Even 
if we cannot conclusively establish that any particular case of activism is 
designed to generate short-term returns for investors, the empirical evi-
dence of the effects of activism does suggest the truth of this conclusion 
in many cases. This conclusion also seems consistent with the conclu-
sion in Section A that many investors, particularly hedge funds, are 
short-termists who desire short-term results. We should indeed expect 
investors who are short-termists and who use a strategy of activism to 
                                                     
113. See, e.g., Lexar Media, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D), at exhibit B 
(Mar. 20, 2006) (filed by Elliott Assocs., L.P.); Lexar Media, Inc., Beneficial Ownership Report 
(Schedule 13D/A, Amend. No.1), at 2 (Apr. 6, 2006) (filed by Icahn Partners Master Fund LP) 
(describing Elliott Associates’ and Icahn’s pressure on the Micron board to oppose the acquisition 
of Lexar). 
114. Klein & Zur, supra note 105, at 38, 40. 
115. Id. at 40. 
116. Id. at 43 (finding that there is no immediate increase in the firm’s accounting profitability 
or other firm performance indicators either pre- or post-activism, and finding, on the contrary, evi-
dence that earnings-per-share ratios (EPS) may decline in the year following the investment that 
triggers 13D filing requirements). Klein and Zur also found that hedge fund targets were not par-
ticularly poor performers. See id. at 24 (finding that the targets of hedge funds have higher earnings, 
are financially healthier, and have more cash on their balance sheets than targets of other entrepre-
neurial activists). But see Greenwood & Schor, supra note 22, at 24 (finding that the targets of 
hedge funds underperformed relative to other firms in their industry). While the Klein/Zur study 
does not look at the impact of this activism over a period of longer than one year, the data does 
suggest that returns, while initially positive, decrease over time. See Klein & Zur, supra note 105, at 
40. 
117. See, e.g., Jonathan Karpoff et al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: 
Empirical Evidence, 42 J. Fin. Econ. 365, 365–69 (1996) (finding shareholder proposals targeting 
corporate governance issues ineffective at increasing shareholder value or improving firm’s longer-
term operating performance). But see Brav et al., supra note 23, at 3 (finding a statistically mea-
ningless reaction from the market for capital structure-related activism and governance-related 
activism but a positive abnormal reaction where hedge funds are active in changing a company’s 
business strategy or a sale of the company); Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional 
Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174, 177 
(2001) (noting that the empirical evidence suggests that shareholder activism has an insignificant 
effect on targeted firms’ performance, and that while a few studies find evidence of a positive im-
pact, other studies find a significant negative stock price effect from activism). 
Grossman%20Final_C[1]  9/3/2010 2:25 PM 
Summer 2010] Board Duties in a New Era 929 
use their sway to bring about short-term results, regardless of the adverse 
impact that might have on a firm in the long-term. 
Many of the reasons discussed in Section A as to why hedge funds are 
often shorter-term investors than other investors also explain why many 
hedge funds are more active than other types of investors.118 Namely, 
because hedge funds are not subject to the diversification requirement 
under the Investment Company Act, they can take larger stakes in public 
companies than can other institutional investors that are subject to that 
act.119 That, in turn, enables hedge funds to receive a larger proportionate 
share of the benefits generated by their activism than they otherwise 
would with a smaller ownership percentage.120 Moreover, because they 
generally earn a percentage of fund profits, fund managers have an in-
centive to use activism to bring about corporate decisions that generate 
profits in the short-term.121 This incentive exists notwithstanding any 
longer-term downside to the firm from those decisions.122 The fact that 
hedge funds can reduce or eliminate the economic risk associated with 
their investments123 might also explain their disproportionate activism, 
for it creates an incentive for them to influence decisions to create stock 
price spikes, but also to cause stock prices to drop, allowing them to 
profit off of those downward adjustments.124 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, investors are becoming increa-
singly influential in corporate decision-making through non-voting 
channels. Empirical evidence suggests that some of those activist efforts, 
particularly those by hedge funds, may impair firm profitability in the 
long-term. Yet even on a theoretical level, investor short-termism 
coupled with the rise of activism is worrisome, for it leads intuitively to 
                                                     
118. In their study, Robin Greenwood and Michael Schor found that hedge funds engaged in 
activism using 13D filings more than four times as often as other institutional investors. See Green-
wood & Schor, supra note 22, at 10. 
119. See supra notes 28–30. 
120. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1062 (arguing that evidence suggests that hedge 
funds enjoy significant economies of scale). 
121. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
122. This is the same phenomenon that causes officers to be short-termists that is discussed in-
fra in Part I.C. 
123. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
124. The King Pharmaceuticals-Mylan Laboratories merger is one of the primary examples of 
a hedge fund hedging away its economic risk associated with a firm’s stock and then supporting a 
merger of that firm with another in which the hedge fund owned a substantial interest at a price that 
stockholders generally viewed as inadequate. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 24, at 1075 (describing 
the Mylan Laboratories transaction as “[a] particularly extreme form of a hedging-related conflict”). 
While the hedge fund did not use activism to influence the Mylan Laboratories board to seek a 
merger, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a hedge fund would seek to influence that 
decision through activism. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 6, at 1286–87 (indicating that conflicts 
between activists and other shareholders can exist when activist shareholders take “adverse posi-
tions” in derivatives or in securities offered by other companies, and citing as an example a hedge 
fund that takes a net short position in a company, which allows the hedge fund to profit from its 
status as a shareholder, and pushes for corporate strategies that drive share price down). 
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the conclusion that investors will, on occasion, use activism to bring 
about decisions that create short-term value, even where that might im-
pair the long-term well-being of a firm. 
Advocates of shareholder voice have justified shareholders’ ability to 
influence the board on the basis that shareholders as a class would never 
vote to adopt measures that did not benefit shareholders collectively—as 
represented by approval by a majority of shareholders.125 This was sup-
ported by the number of shareholder proposals that addressed social 
concerns of pension funds that did not receive majority vote approval.126 
But now that shareholders are affecting corporate decisions outside of 
the shareholder franchise, it once again raises the concern that share-
holders are influencing board decisions in their own self-interest, 
without any “cleansing” majority shareholder vote to ensure their actions 
benefit the majority of shareholders. The fact that many activist investors 
have shorter investment horizons than other investors only contributes to 
the long-term risk to corporations of this type of activism. 
C. Executive Officer Short-Termism Affects Board Decisions 
Investors are not the only class of corporate constituent that has rea-
sons to pressure the board for decisions that yield short-term results. 
Executive officers also have reasons to want a corporation to be profita-
ble in the short-term.  
The primary rationale for executives’ short-term focus is the preva-
lence of the executive compensation practice of tying executive 
compensation to short-term financial metrics such as stock price and 
earnings per share.127 This creates an incentive for  
officers to manage with the goal of maximizing short-term profits, there-
by increasing the amount of their compensation.128 This short-termism 
                                                     
125. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the 
Business Roundtable, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 557, 564 (2005) (“Indeed, past voting patterns clear-
ly indicate that shareholder resolutions that are brought because of their appeal to shareholders with 
special interests generally do not pass.”). 
126. See discussion supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
127. See Comm. for Econ. Dev., supra note 49, at 3 (“Performance triggers for incentive pay-
ments, when used, are often tied to short-term financial indicators such as annual earnings per share 
or share-price performance. Such targets encourage executives to adopt too short a time horizon and 
to focus too much on short-term share price and accounting measures and not enough on long-term 
strategic development.”); Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based Com-
pensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 227, 234 (1999). 
128. See Comm. for Econ. Dev., supra note 49, at 3. One might ask why shareholders tolerate 
such lavish pay practices, as that likely means there are fewer assets available to shareholders. One 
likely reason is that this practice does not constitute a breach of any duty owed to shareholders so 
long as there is a rational business purpose associated with the compensation decision, and the deci-
sion is not made in bad faith. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 
2006). Moreover, short-termists likely tolerate this practice as it means that managers are generating 
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by officers impacts boards, for boards rely heavily on officers to provide 
the information the board needs to make business decisions.129 Thus of-
ficers have an incentive—and the means—to provide information 
favoring short-term business decisions. Boards also rely heavily on of-
ficers in forming strategy, for boards are effectively overseers of the 
strategic-planning process.130 Again, to the extent officers control strate-
gy-setting and related information flows to the board, that process is 
undoubtedly imbued by officers’ short-term agendas. This is particularly 
true as boards become more independent per SEC and stock exchange 
rules, placing them more at the mercy of corporate insiders for informa-
tion and strategic ideas.131 
There is a strong movement afoot to tie officer compensation to long-
term performance targets.132 This is exemplified by the large number of 
proposals made by shareholders since 2006 requesting that shareholders 
be given an advisory vote on executives’ compensation, or a “say on 
pay.”133 While those proposals generally do not identify as their goal a 
desire to tie management compensation to long-term performance, 
boards seems to interpret that as their implicit purpose, as they generally 
respond by identifying how their compensation arrangements already 
award managers for long-term profitability.134 
                                                     
short-term profits for their benefit as well. See discussion supra Part I.A; see also Daniel J.H. 
Greenwood, The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shares Entitled to the Residual?, 32 J. Corp. L. 103, 151–52 
(2006) (arguing that while shareholders do not have the right to receive dividends, they have the 
good fortune of receiving them as a side-effect of managerial self-enrichment). 
129. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Di-
rectors, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 89, 105 (2004) (“As a practical matter, the outside directors must rely on 
information presented to them by the corporation’s officers when making decisions. . . . Given these 
constraints of time and information, the board can hardly initiate much of any corporate strategy or 
decisions. Instead, the board’s role largely falls to approval of such strategies and decisions as offic-
ers bring before the board.”). 
130. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate 
Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1399, 1415 (2005) (“[T]he board of directors will actually direct and monitor the management 
of the company, including strategic business plans . . . .”). 
131. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Compo-
sition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921, 951 (1999) (citing Barry Baysinger & Robert E. 
Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate 
Strategy, 15 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 72 (1990)) (arguing that insiders may be better at making strategic 
planning decisions). But see Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, 
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 
803 (2001) (arguing that objective outsiders also serve a useful purpose in strategic planning as they 
can expose insiders’ biases). 
132. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Is-
sues, 30 J. Corp. L. 647, 670 (2005). 
133. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
134. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp., Definitive Additional Proxy Soliciting Materials and Rule 
14(a)(12) Materials (Schedule 14A), at 2 (May 12, 2008) (“The Board works diligently to ensure 
that the Company’s compensation philosophy and elements drive behavior that is aligned with long-
term shareholder value creation.”); UnitedHealth Group Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 
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The federal government, too, has immersed itself in this movement 
towards coupling manager compensation and long-term corporate per-
formance. While the world awaited a quick Congressional response to 
the financial crisis that threatened the survival of insurance giant AIG 
and banks Bank of America and Citigroup, among others, Congress de-
bated how to limit the profit-based compensation of the executives 
whose institutions were ailing and needed financial assistance.135 The 
result was a host of restrictions in the law setting forth the U.S. Trea-
sury’s initial effort at a bail-out—the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, or EESA—aimed at de-coupling executive compensation 
and short-term performance at companies that receive meaningful finan-
cial assistance from the U.S. Treasury.136 These restrictions include a 
prohibition on senior executives’ compensation for “unnecessary and 
excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution.”137 
Moreover, those executives must repay any income awarded to them due 
to financial performance that later turns out to be materially errone-
ous.138 And none of those executives may receive a severance bonus 
upon a change in control while the Treasury holds its investment.139  
Congress passed a second bail-out law—the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, or ARRA—on the heels of the EESA, with 
the goal of stimulating the U.S. economy primarily through federal tax 
cuts, job creation, and domestic spending initiatives.140 The ARRA great-
ly expands on the EESA’s compensation restrictions by capping the 
amount of incentive compensation that may be paid to senior executives 
of companies that receive financial assistance under the EESA to one 
third of the amount of their salaries.141 Yet the ARRA goes further, cap-
ping the salaries, not only of top executives, but also of the next 20 most 
highly paid employees, at companies that receive exceptional assistance 
                                                     
14A), at 21 (Apr. 29, 2008) (“We endeavor to closely align these goals [the achievement of enter-
prise, business unit, and individual goals] with shareholder interests by defining expected business, 
customer and employee outcomes that create shareholder value over the longer term.”). 
135. See 110 Cong. Rec. H10,702–10, H10,712–06 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2008); 110 Cong. Rec. 
S10,220–83, S10,291–95 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2008); 110 Cong. Rec. H10,337–11 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 
2008). 
136. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201–5261 (West 
Supp. 2009), amended by American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (2009).  
137. Id. § 5221(b)(2)(A). 
138. Id. § 5221(b)(2)(B). This requirement is similar to the claw-back provision of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002, though SOX requires misconduct for the claw-back requirement to kick 
in. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243(a) (West 2009). 
139. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221(b)(2)(C). 
140. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 3, 123 Stat. at 115–16. 
141. Id. § 7001, 123 Stat. at 517–18. Moreover, this incentive compensation may only be paid 
in the form of long-term restricted stock. Id. 
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from the U.S. Treasury.142 While these restrictions follow on the heels of 
the EESA’s efforts to curb the mis-match between executive compensa-
tion and true long-term performance, they clearly go further by limiting 
the total compensation (regardless of long-term profitability) that may be 
paid to the most highly compensated employees at all companies that 
receive funds from the U.S. Treasury.143 
These new bail-out laws are clearly targeted at limiting the incentives 
for executives to manage in a way that benefits themselves financially in 
the short-term, notwithstanding the future risks those decisions pose, 
including the disappearance of those profits over the long-term. Still, the 
EESA and ARRA only apply to firms that receive financial assistance 
from the U.S. Treasury—and many of the restrictions only apply to the 
senior executives at firms that receive significant financial assistance. 
Yet it should be obvious that the compensation problems that these laws 
seek to address are not limited to the few institutions that obtain finan-
cial assistance from the U.S. Treasury. Nevertheless, through these laws 
Congress likely sought to set new standards in the area of executive 
compensation, to be followed by boards of firms that do not receive the 
U.S. Treasury’s financial assistance.144 This is consistent with the mes-
                                                     
142. Id. This restriction applies to officers and employees at companies that receive more than 
$500 million in funding under the TARP established under the EESA. Id. The act also expands the 
ban on golden parachutes under the EESA so that it applies to all companies that receive funds from 
the U.S. Treasury under the TARP. Id. This act more broadly implements some of the guidelines 
that had previously been promulgated by the U.S. Treasury, also aimed at limiting the compensation 
of top executives. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Announces New Restrictions 
on Executive Compensation (Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury] (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
tg15.htm. In these guidelines, the Treasury also called for the SEC’s cooperation to pass regulations 
that require compensation committees of all public financial institutions to review and disclose 
executive and certain employee compensation arrangements and explain how these compensation 
arrangements are consistent with promoting sound risk management and long-term value creation 
for their companies and their shareholders. Id. The Federal Reserve is also in the process of propos-
ing new rules that would give it an effective approval right over all bankers’ pay with the goal of 
restricting pay plans that encourage reckless behavior by rewarding only short-term gains. Damian 
Paletta & Jon Hilsenrath, Bankers Face Sweeping Curbs on Pay, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 2009, at A1. 
143. As Professor Lucian Bebchuk has argued, the restriction in the ARRA “[m]andating that 
at least two-thirds of an executive’s total pay be decoupled from performance, as the stimulus bill 
does, is a step in the wrong direction,” as it constrains boards’ ability to reward executives for long-
term performance. Lucian Bebchuk, Congress Gets Punitive on Executive Pay, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 
2009, at A15. 
144. This seems to be yet another example of Congress treading on state corporate law’s do-
main of regulating internal affairs of corporations incorporated in those states. See Thomas Lee 
Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 809 (5th ed. 2006) (noting a departure after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 from the dichotomy where states define officers’ and directors’ duties and feder-
al securities laws regulate information provided to investors). On that basis, I question whether a 
federal, one-size fits all legislation in the area of executive compensation is the best way to address 
the problem of excessive short-termism, especially given the myriad of different reasons why inves-
tors and boards are short-termists, as discussed in this Article. My recommendation for addressing 
the short-termism problem in a more general way is discussed in Part V infra. 
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sage that has been repeatedly delivered by President Obama’s adminis-
tration that the administration is placing at the top of its agenda curbing 
the mis-match between executive compensation and corporate perfor-
mance.145 
Still, these acts only address one source of short-termism—that 
created by executive compensation practices. They do not, however, 
provide a comprehensive approach to the problem of short-termism, nor 
do they offer a coherent strategy to re-orient boards and managers on the 
long-term. 
D. Summary 
While the stock market would, in an ideal world, cause investors to 
price a corporation’s stock at its true value, we do not live in an ideal 
world. Stock prices seem to overly reflect firms’ short-term values. That 
largely stems from investors’ over-reliance on financial statements that 
fail to capture firms’ long-term values. While not every investor is a 
“short-termist,” these information biases would tend to make investors 
more short-termist than they might otherwise be. Investor short-termism 
also emerges from investors’ irrational behavior, exemplified by the cur-
rent financial crisis in which investors got caught up in the housing 
bubble and herded to the same financial securities despite the long-term 
risks of those investments. 
Investors whose investment strategies include activism tend to have 
shorter investment horizons than the average investor. These investors 
have been using techniques outside of the shareholder franchise to com-
pel boards to make decisions that benefit these investors in the short-
term, while having a potential value-destroying impact on the corpora-
tion in the long-term. Directors are not impervious to these short-term 
pressures, not only because they risk not being reelected if they appear 
to be unresponsive to shareholder demands, but also because they are 
exposed to the risk of ouster in connection with a takeover transaction if 
they do not maintain a high stock price. Directors likely also focus on 
                                                     
145. See, e.g., Pres. Barack Obama, Remarks by President Barack Obama on Executive Com-
pensation with Secretary Geithner (Feb. 4, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/RemarksbyPresidentBarackObamaOnExecutiveComp
ensationSecretaryGeithner) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (“[I]n 
order to restore our financial system, we’ve got to restore trust. And in order to restore trust, we’ve 
got to make certain that taxpayer funds are not subsidizing excessive compensation packages on 
Wall Street.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 142 (“[T]he standards [referring to 
the new Treasury guidelines on executive pay] . . . mark the beginning of a long-term effort to ex-
amine both the degree that executive compensation structures at financial institutions contributed to 
our current financial crisis and how corporate governance and compensation rules can be reformed 
to better promote long-term value and growth for shareholders, companies, workers and the econo-
my at large and to prevent such financial crises from occurring again.”). 
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short-term performance because that is the time period as to which ex-
ecutives are concerned, due to the nature of their compensation. That 
impacts the board because the executive officers are the board’s primary 
source for information about the corporation’s operations as well as 
areas for growth. Moreover, the executive officers actually develop and 
implement the corporation’s strategy while the board merely oversees 
that from its independence perch. 
But is short-termism necessarily a bad thing? In other words, might it 
not be a good thing to allow investors and managers to profit off of 
short-term stock price movements, even if that impairs a corporation’s 
long-term success? That is the question that I turn to next. 
II. Is Short-Termism Bad? 
We need to look no further than the current financial meltdown to get 
a sense of the ill effects of corporate short-termism, not just on individu-
al business enterprises, but on the entire U.S. economy and community. 
To set the stage, we must first understand the role of short-termism in 
causing the recent crisis. 
Leading up to the current financial crisis, financial institutions took 
large positions in mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs).146 MBSs are securities whose payment derives 
principally or entirely from mortgage loans, while CDOs are securities 
whose payment derives from a mixed pool of mortgage loans and other 
receivables.147 When home prices plummeted in 2008, many borrowers 
defaulted on their loans, including loans that backed MBSs and 
CDOs.148 The result was either the impairment, or total loss, in value of 
MBSs and CDOs, particularly those that were more junior in priority of 
payment.149  
One of the primary reasons why financial institutions invested so 
heavily in these securities is that they failed to appreciate the longer-term 
risks associated with these investments—particularly the risk of a hous-
                                                     
146. According to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, subprime lending grew from $35 
billion in 1994 to $600 billion in 2006. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. 
Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting (Mar. 
14, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20080314a.htm) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform). These sub-prime loans were loans that backed MBSs and CDOs. See Schwarcz, 
supra note 68, at 375–76 (explaining how the subprime mortgage meltdown infected the markets for 
MBSs and CDOs). 
147. Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 376. There is a separate class of securities that is backed by a 
mixed pool of MBSs and other asset-backed securities (ABSs), referred to as ABS CDOs. Id. To the 
extent those pools contain MBSs, they, too, derive their payments from mortgage loans. Id. 
148. Id. at 378–79. 
149. Id. 
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ing market collapse.150 This may have resulted from the euphoria of the 
moment (i.e., a bubble), where investors failed to pay close attention to 
what they were buying,151 or the herding phenomenon, meaning inves-
tors simply followed the pack to invest in MBSs and CDOs.152 Or it may 
have resulted from factors similar to those that impel executives to man-
age for the short-term—namely, compensation for originators and 
investment  
bankers that was tied to short-term success (i.e., security placement) 
notwithstanding the longer-term risks of an investment in the securities 
they originated and sold.153 As a consequence, many firms had large ex-
posures to MBSs and CDOs that, once the longer-term risks 
materialized, generated tremendous firm losses, reversing previously 
realized profits.154 
These losses have had a significant impact not only on the firms that 
invested in the MBSs and CDOs, but also on the entire U.S. economy. 
Due to the failure of so many financial institutions, the credit markets 
have seized up, making it very difficult for U.S. businesses to get the 
debt financing they have needed to operate.155 This has, in turn, led to a 
dramatic decline in capital spending and R&D.156  
This is alarming, for capital investments and R&D are the lifeblood of 
corporate growth.157 Without these types of investments and expendi-
tures, there would be no new income-producing assets, and no new 
                                                     
150. Id. at 379 (arguing that the failure of investors to envision a worst-case scenario that 
would result from the fall of the housing market reflected to some extent a failure to take a suffi-
ciently long-term view of risk); see also Lowenstein, supra note 16, at 10 (“Nobody [who invested 
in MBSs and in the banks that own them] was thinking about what these companies were worth, 
only about the next quotation on the screen.”). But see Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 380 (arguing that 
the failure to have forecasted a worst-case possibility such as the experience of the Great Depression 
is inevitable since that is assessed ex ante). 
151. Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 382. Some investors undoubtedly decided, rationally, to in-
vest in these securities with the hope of benefiting from the housing market bubble before it burst. 
152. Id. This phenomenon, again, could have been the product of rational choice by some in-
vestors who believed they could break from the herd before the market collapsed. 
153. See id. at 384–85. 
154. Though not for the originators and fund managers whose compensation was not clawed 
back following these losses. Id. 
155. See Craig K. Elwell, Financial Market Turmoil and U.S. Macroeconomic Performance 1 
(2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40007_20081203.pdf (“The move toward short-term lending dimi-
nishes the flow of long-term credit to the non-financial economy and dampens the economic 
activities of households and businesses that are dependent on borrowing.”). 
156. See id. at 5 (“After advancing 7.5% in 2006, the pace of spending by businesses on new 
plant and equipment slowed to 5.0% in 2007, and through the second quarter of 2008 that pace had 
slowed to about 2.3%.”). 
157. See Michael E. Porter, Why America Needs an Economic Strategy, Bus. Wk., Nov. 10, 
2008, at 39, 40 (“An inadequate rate of reinvestment in science and technology is hampering Amer-
ica’s feeder system for entrepreneurship.”). 
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innovations, to steam corporate growth.158 A firm creates wealth through 
capital investments or R&D by investing in new products and new ways 
to produce or commercialize existing products and services.159 But it 
takes time for these investments to materialize, since they necessarily 
involve something new and unknown.160 
The seizing up of the credit markets post-crisis does not alone explain 
the decline in capital investments and R&D expenditures. This is likely 
also due in part to pressure placed on managers to forego R&D and capi-
tal expenditures as a way to boost corporate profits.161 Unless this 
pressure is alleviated, the trend towards decreasing levels of capital in-
vestments and R&D may continue, leading to a decline in innovation 
and entrepreneurism in the U.S. 
The financial crisis also shows the significant social cost of the failure 
of numerous large U.S. public companies. Since the start of the 2008 
economic crisis, the U.S. unemployment rate has soared to 10% (in De-
cember 2009) from 5% (in December 2007).162 And the trend of an 
unemployment rate close to 10% seems to be continuing.163  
All of these and other adverse consequences of the financial crisis 
reaffirm the view of the corporation—specifically the public corpora-
tion—as not simply an autonomous, self-contained economic unit, but 
instead as a key member of the economic and social fabric of the U.S. 
economy.164 Recognizing the impact of the crisis on U.S. businesses, the 
                                                     
158. See William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a 
Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 Bus. Law. 
1383, 1388 (2005) (“For [Martin Lipton], social wealth is actually created, not in financial markets, 
but within corporations—where research scientists invent products, engineers plan, and marketing 
and production people at all levels of the corporation develop and execute strategies to deliver at-
tractive goods and services efficiently.”); Porter, supra note 157. 
159. See Houman B. Shadab, Innovation and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 955, 962 (2008) (“The capability of a firm to create change 
through innovation . . . is a source of value to the business and its shareholders. For this reason, 
successful innovation results in better economic performance . . . .”). 
160. See id. at 963. 
161. See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
162. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation: December 2008 (2009) (on file 
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_01092009.htm; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor 
Force Statistics From the Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/ 
PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS14000000 [hereinafter 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform). From December 2005 to December 2007, the rate had fluctuated between 4.4% 
and 5.0%. Id. 
163. U.S. Department of Labor statistics show that the unemployment rate since December 
2009 has fluctuated between 9.7 and 9.9. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics, supra 
note 162. 
164. Berle and Means recognized this to be true over 75 years ago. See Berle & Means, supra 
note 12, at 1 (describing the public corporation as a “major social institution”); see also Kent Green-
field, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 Emory L.J. 948, 963 (2008) (arguing 
that the ultimate goal of corporate law should be to create societal wealth, broadly defined). 
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economy, and the citizenry, the federal government has staged the largest 
cumulative financial assistance package ever conceived, providing over 
$2.1 trillion in capital to U.S. businesses.165 The terms of the financial 
assistance clearly show a policy in favor of U.S. businesses creating sus-
tainable business models. This is reflected in the compensation 
provisions of the EESA and ARRA,166 as well as in the conditions placed 
on the funds made available to GM and Chrysler.167 It is also apparent 
from repeated messages delivered by the Obama administration that U.S. 
businesses need to be successful in the long-term.168 
In summary, the current financial crisis has shown the ills of corporate 
short-termism on U.S. businesses as well as on our national economy 
and citizenry. Not only did businesses fail to appreciate, or choose to 
ignore, risks associated with their investments due to their short-term 
profit-induced stupor, but they also failed to protect themselves from 
those risks. The collective impact has been numerous corporate failures, 
a serious contraction in credit markets, an alarming decline in employ-
ment, and an overall skepticism as to the strength of the U.S. economy. 
That is not to say that corporations, and corporate law, should be de-
signed to enhance social wealth without regard to financial returns to 
investors. In fact, if directors ignored or placed a second priority on 
stockholders’ financial interests, investors would undoubtedly be reluc-
tant to part with their money for fear that their investments would simply 
be used to create wealth for others in society. But corporate law, as with 
other law, reflects a series of policy choices.169 Thus the policies that 
                                                     
165. Adding Up the Government’s Total Bailout Tab, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailout-totals-graphic.html (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating that the government has spent 
$528 billion lending to businesses and $1.6 trillion investing in businesses). The above amount does 
not include financial assistance in the form of government insurance or tax benefits. 
166. See discussion supra notes 136–43 and accompanying text. 
167. Both Congress and the administration set as a condition to financial assistance to GM and 
Chrysler that they each present a business plan showing how they could be profitable on a sustaina-
ble basis. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Program Descriptions: Automotive Industry Financing 
Program (July 6, 2009), http://financialstability.gov/roadtostability/ 
programs.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating that the 
Automotive Industry Financing Program “will require steps be taken by participating firms to im-
plement plans that achieve long-term viability”). For more detailed information concerning the 
Automotive Industry Financing Program, see U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Automotive Industry Financ-
ing Program, http://financialstability.gov/roadtostability/ 
autoprogram.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
168. See, e.g., Pres. Barack Obama, Weekly Address of President-elect Barack Obama (Jan. 3, 
2009) (transcript available at http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/american_ 
recovery_and_reinvestment/) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) 
(“We need an American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan that not only creates jobs in the short-
term but spurs economic growth and competitiveness in the long-term.”). 
169. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 193 (“Given the corporation’s origins as a his-
torical and legal construct created for specific public policy reasons, the state naturally may choose 
Grossman%20Final_C[1]  9/3/2010 2:25 PM 
Summer 2010] Board Duties in a New Era 939 
serve as the foundation for our corporate laws should reflect the reality 
that the purpose of corporations is not simply to generate quick wealth 
for shareholders, but to generate sustained wealth for shareholders, as 
well as for our society as a whole. As William Allen, former Chancellor 
of the Delaware Chancery Court, and Vice Chancellor Strine have keen-
ly observed on this point, “corporation law itself, in this view [referring 
to Martin Lipton’s institutionalist view], is seen as but a part of a larger 
economic and social policy that sought and seeks to promote wealth cre-
ation, not simply for the benefit of stockholders and managers, but more 
generally for the benefit of a nation.”170 
As a vital component to the creation of durable societal wealth, corpo-
rations must look to being successful in the long-term, to give their 
capital investments and innovative projects time to germinate and yield 
returns. It is counterproductive to this goal for corporations to focus pri-
marily on generating profits for their investors on a quarter-to-quarter or 
even year-to-year basis.171 Because long-term wealth creation is a sub-
stantial policy concern, corporate laws should be designed to further that 
interest and to dissuade corporate players from pursing counter-
productive goals. 
The obvious question then becomes: how do we fix our system so that 
it achieves the goal of long-term value creation? In my view, the most 
sensible place to start is at the board level, as directors are the hubs that 
keep the corporate spokes together. More  
specifically, directors are charged with overseeing a corporation’s busi-
ness and affairs.172 In that capacity, they have the duty to make business 
decisions and oversee the corporation with the objective of the corpora-
tion achieving its business purpose.173 Therefore, it makes sense to 
                                                     
to condition the use of the corporate form upon compliance with rules that advance societal goals, 
even if those goals clash with stockholder interests.”). 
170. Allen & Strine, supra note 158, at 1385; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response, Toward a 
True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corpo-
rate America, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1759, 1764 (2006) (“The primary goal of corporate law [under the 
traditionalist perspective], therefore, is not to prevent failure at each and every firm to the fullest 
extent possible, but to facilitate the maximum creation of durable societal wealth by all firms.”). For 
an explanation of how business decisions can be made in the interest of both shareholders and socie-
ty, see discussion infra Part IV. 
171. The many business and investment leaders who met at the Conference Board’s Corpo-
rate/Investment summit echoed this sentiment. As their report states, “Undoubtedly, the health of an 
economic system depends on its ability to perform well year after year—not only during the next 
quarter.” Tonello, supra note 49, at 5; see also Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 192 (“The 
health and stability of these economies [referring to the economies of the U.S. and U.K.] depends on 
the ability of corporations to maintain healthy and stable business operations over the long term and 
to compete in world markets.”). 
172. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
173. See discussion infra Part III.A. This is true even though the business judgment rule gener-
ally shields directors from liability for decisions that have a rational business purpose and are made 
in good faith.  
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implement the corporate objective of long-term value creation through 
the board, the primary overseer of corporate operations and strategy. It is 
thus to the board that I turn to next. 
III. What it Means for Directors to Act in the Best Interest 
of the Corporation and its Stockholders 
As I discuss in Part I, investors in public companies as well as some 
executives have reasons to want corporations to generate profits in the 
short-term. Part I also explains how those investors and executives can 
influence boards to make decisions that are responsive to their short-
term interests. However as I explain in Part II, managing a corporation 
for the benefit of those short-term interests is antithetical to the goal of 
creating sustainable wealth for individual businesses and for our econo-
my.  
This section explains why directors have the freedom to be responsive 
to investors’ and executives’ short-term interests under their fiduciary 
duties, even though that runs counter to the interests of long-term 
minded investors, other corporate constituents, and our economy. This 
discussion focuses on Delaware law, not only because it is the jurisdic-
tion where the majority of public corporations are incorporated,174 but 
also because Delaware law is followed, or looked to for guidance by, 
courts in other jurisdictions.175 
A. Introduction 
Directors oversee the management of the business and affairs of the 
corporation on whose board they serve.176 In this capacity, they are de-
scribed as fiduciaries of the corporation and its shareholders.177 That 
means that in exercising their powers, directors must comply with their 
fiduciary duties.178 
                                                     
174. See 1 Block et al., supra note 93, at 2–3 (finding that a majority of public corporations are 
incorporated in Delaware).  
175. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of 
Corporate Governance Reform, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 393, 397 (2007); see also Dennis J. 
Connolly & Bess M. Parrish, Current Issues Involving the Application of Exculpation and the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule to Creditors’ Suits Against Directors of Insolvent Corporations, 2006 Ann. 
Surv. Bankr. L. 1, 4. 
176. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
177. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 
(Del. 1939)). 
178. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).  
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In Delaware, directors owe the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.179 
Under the duty of care, every director must become informed of all ma-
terial information reasonably available before making a business 
decision.180 However, due to operation of the business judgment rule, 
directors are only liable for failing to comply with that duty where their 
failure amounts to gross negligence.181 And even then they might not be 
liable if the corporation has an exculpation charter provision or other-
wise agrees to exculpate the directors for breaches of the duty of care.182  
The duty of loyalty mandates that every director act in good faith in a 
manner she reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.183 Courts typically analyze the duty of loyalty 
by explaining how a director violates that duty.184 As such, a director 
breaches her duty of loyalty where she acts in a way that works injury to 
the corporation, or she deprives the corporation of a profit or advantage 
either that her skills and ability might bring to the corporation, or that the 
corporation would make in the exercise of its powers.185 
Moreover, a director violates her duty of loyalty where she acts in bad 
faith.186 The Delaware Supreme Court has identified at least three ways 
in which a director can be found to have acted in bad faith.187 One way is 
to consciously disregard her duties.188 Bad faith also exists where a di-
rector acts with a subjective intent to harm a corporation.189 A third type 
of bad faith involves a director who acts carelessly with a higher state of 
culpability than gross negligence, though it is not entirely clear exactly 
what level of culpability is required.190  
                                                     
179. Id. at 367 (“Duty of care and duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary 
who endeavors to act in the service of a corporation and its stockholders.”). 
180. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
181. Id. Under the business judgment rule, business decisions are presumed to have been made 
in good faith, on an informed basis, and in an honest belief that the action taken is in the best inter-
est of the corporation. Id. To rebut that presumption, a stockholder must prove that the board failed 
to so inform itself, and that failure amounted to gross negligence. Id. 
182. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 
1095 (Del. 2001) (“Our jurisprudence since the adoption of the statute has consistently stood for the 
proposition that a Section 102(b)(7) charter provision bars a claim that is found to state only a due 
care violation.”). Corporations can also indemnify directors for breaches of their duty of care. See 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 145. 
183. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984)). 
184. See, e.g., id. at 362 (“Classic examples of director self-interest in a business transaction 
involve either a director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal 
benefit from a transaction not received by the shareholders generally.”). 
185. Id. at 361; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
186. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (clari-
fying that the failure to act in good faith results in liability because it is a necessary condition to 
compliance with the duty of loyalty). 
187. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).  
188. Id. at 66–67. 
189. Id. at 64. 
190. See id. at 64–66. 
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But fiduciary duties are not merely proscriptive, indicating what con-
duct a director may not engage in. They also require directors to 
affirmatively protect the interests of the corporation committed to her 
charge.191 This affirmative aspect of fiduciary duties is important, for it 
instructs directors that their business decisions and oversight responsibil-
ities must be implemented not merely to avoid breaching a duty of trust 
to the corporation, but to affirmatively advance the corporation’s pur-
pose.  
Delaware court decisions have focused much less on this positive as-
pect of fiduciary duties than on their proscriptive aspects. That is 
undoubtedly due to the fact that the cases that appear before the Dela-
ware courts involve sub-par director conduct, where the courts are asked 
to determine whether that conduct meets the applicable standard of lia-
bility. Yet it is important to understand exactly what the affirmative 
aspect of fiduciary duties requires, for that establishes what purpose, and 
for whose benefit, directors must manage and oversee corporate af-
fairs.192 
It seems particularly important to determine how directors  
affirmatively act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockhold-
ers in the current environment, as investors are increasingly placing 
pressure on boards to make decisions that yield  
short-term results and executive compensation arrangements are driving 
managers to present information and strategic options to the board that 
are unduly focused on short-term profits. By determining what the cor-
poration’s and its stockholders’ true interests are that directors must 
                                                     
191. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“Not only do these principles demand that cor-
porate fiduciaries absolutely refrain from any act which breaches the trust reposed in them, but also 
to affirmatively protect and defend those interests entrusted to them.” (emphasis added)); Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he board’s power to act derives 
from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stock-
holders, from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its source.”); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 
503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
192. Not undertaking sufficient processes to make informed decisions that further the corpora-
tion’s purpose, or perhaps not understanding what the corporation’s purpose is, would seem to be a 
conscious disregard of a duty, and thus amount to bad faith under the duty of loyalty. See In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749–50 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) 
(“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively 
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’, provides no 
ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either 
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.” (quoting In re Caremark 
Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996))); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Busi-
ness Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 Duke L.J. 1, 41–42 
(2005) (“The duty of care, in other words, contains within itself an assumption that the decision-
maker is motivated by the corporation’s business purpose.”). While the duty of care largely lacks 
teeth, as directors can be exculpated for liability arising out of breaches of that duty, directors’ fail-
ure to exercise sufficient care may create liability where that failure amounts to bad faith. See supra 
notes 182, 186–88 and accompanying text. 
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advance, directors should be able to more clearly determine whether 
their decisions and oversight duties are truly being performed in the best 
interest of the constituents who they must protect under their fiduciary 
duties. 
The remaining portion of this Part IV explores how the Delaware 
courts have interpreted and applied the positive duty to act in the “best 
interest of the corporation and its stockholders.”  
B. Acting in the Best Interest of the Corporation and its Stockholders  
In Delaware, courts generally interpret the affirmative duty to act in 
the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders as imposing on 
directors the duty to advance corporate wealth through profitability.193 
While courts generally state this guiding principle to be true, they do not 
provide any consistent explanation as to the basis for it.194 Yet two lines 
of cases suggest two distinct rationales for this corporate purpose.  
In one line of cases, the Delaware courts have suggested that directors 
must make decisions with the sole objective of maximizing profits be-
cause that is what stockholders, the sole residual  
beneficiaries of the corporation, want.195 Presumably the stream of logic 
flows as follows: common shareholders are the residual beneficiaries of 
a corporation because when a shareholder invests in a corporation’s 
common stock, that stock entitles the holder to a proportionate share in 
the assets of the enterprise after all claims of debtors and other claimants 
are satisfied.196 That means that on dissolution, shareholders receive the 
value of a corporation’s assets in excess of its debts. Not surprisingly, the 
difference between the value of assets and debts on a corporation’s bal-
ance sheet (after taking into account stated capital) is called 
                                                     
193. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) 
(“This broad mandate [referring to the board’s duty to manage the business and affairs of a corpora-
tion under the Delaware General Corporation Law § 141(a)] includes a conferred authority to set a 
corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability.”). 
194. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 
163, 171 (2008) (noting that dicta in some cases suggest directors ought to attempt to maximize 
shareholder wealth in the long run while dicta in other cases take a broader view of corporate pur-
pose). 
195. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
101 (Del. 2007) (“The directors of Delaware corporations have the legal responsibility to manage 
the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholders owners. . . . [The shareholders] are 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s growth and increased value.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 886 n.7 (Del. 2002). 
196. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 281 (2001) (requiring, in dissolution, that all non-shareholder 
claimants’ claims be paid first, and thereafter “[a]ny remaining assets shall be distributed to the 
stockholders of the dissolved corporation”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited 
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 601, 613 (2006). 
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“shareholders’ equity.”197 Shareholders’ equity grows when the value of 
assets increases (without a corresponding increase in debts), which oc-
curs as profits accumulate.198 Thus the more profits a corporation earns, 
the higher its shareholders’ equity will be (unless/until those profits are 
distributed to shareholders or used in operations). 
Yet by indicating the corporate purpose in terms only of what share-
holders want (profits), some courts have effectively ignored what the 
interest of the “corporation” is. The flaw in this construction, of course, 
is that Delaware courts consistently pronounce fiduciary duties as being 
owed to both shareholders and the corporation.199 We must therefore 
assume that both are intended to be covered by fiduciary duties. The fact 
that the inclusion of both the “corporation” and “stockholders” in fidu-
ciary duties has persisted for so long and been referred to so pervasively 
in Delaware court opinions lends further support to the fact that these 
bodies are both intended to be included.200 
Perhaps these courts only look at the interest of stockholders in as-
sessing to whom fiduciary duties are owed as only stockholders have the 
right to enforce fiduciary duties against directors.201 Yet that does not 
mean that directors do not owe the corporation these duties. Rather, it 
may mean that stockholders generally represent the interests of all con-
stituents in the context of derivative suits against directors—thus there is 
no need for other constituents to also have standing to bring derivative 
suits.202 This may be particularly true considering the potential cost of 
empowering all constituents to bring derivative suits. Or it may reveal an 
                                                     
197. See John G. Helmkamp et al., Principles of Accounting 15–16, 659 (3rd ed. 1989); Roger 
H. Hermanson et al., Financial Accounting: A Business Perspective 19 (8th ed. 2002). Though the 
balance sheet only shows assets’ book values, not fair market values. Helmkamp et al., supra, at 
119; Hermanson et al., supra, at 109. 
198. Hermanson et al., supra note 197, at 16–17. Shareholders’ equity also grows with the in-
crease in value of existing assets. 
199. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
200. Delaware statutory law also supports the distinction between the corporation and its 
stockholders. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 121 (describing a corporation’s general powers and 
distinguishing the corporation from its officers, directors, and stockholders). The fact that the corpo-
ration is distinct from its shareholders also necessarily follows from the fact that key characteristics 
of the corporation—including its legal personality, permanent existence, limited liability, entity-
level taxation, and centralized management—all flow from its separateness. Greenwood, supra note 
128, at 126. This distinction is also apparent from the corporate veil that exists between the corpora-
tion and its shareholders, freeing shareholders from corporate liabilities in most circumstances. See 
id. 
201. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 
2007). Though upon a corporation becoming insolvent, its creditors, too, may enforce the directors’ 
fiduciary duties. Id. 
202. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role 
of the Corporate Board, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 403, 427 (2001) (“[C]areful inspection of the substantive 
nature of directors’ fiduciary duties reveals that shareholders can only bring a successful derivative 
suit in circumstances where directors act in a fashion that hurts not just shareholders, but other 
residual claimants as well.”). 
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aspirational aspect of fiduciary duties, where the standard of conduct 
that courts want boards to achieve (that directors act in the best interest 
of the corporation, including all of its constituents) varies from the stan-
dard of review (that directors will only be held liable for breaches where 
their conduct adversely impacts stockholders).203 Yet perhaps courts in 
this line of cases do not separately analyze (or mention) the duty owed to 
the corporation because they believe the interests of the corporation and 
its stockholders are exactly the same. 
In the other line of cases, the Delaware courts have recognized that 
the corporation’s interest is a unique component of fiduciary duties and 
have authorized the board to consider that interest separately from the 
interest of stockholders.204 In those cases, the courts have typically pre-
sumed that the corporation’s interest, like stockholders’ interest, is in 
corporate profitability.205 Yet they generally have made this assumption 
without any analysis as to what the corporation’s interest is or why it is 
in profitability. Thus the presumption underlying these decisions, like the 
cases discussed above, seems to be that board decisions designed to en-
hance corporate profitability are in the interests of both the corporation 
and its stockholders.206  
Still, the Delaware courts have on occasion suggested that the interest 
of the corporation may differ from the interest of stockholders, at least in 
the takeover context.207 Unocal, decided in 1985, involved a challenged 
Unocal board decision to offer to repurchase Unocal stock for cash as a 
defensive measure, to prevent Unocal stockholders from tendering 
                                                     
203. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 130, at 1416 (explaining the difference between 
a standard of conduct, which is an aspirational standard for what is expected of directors, and a 
standard of review, which governs whether a director will be held liable). The classic example of 
the aspirational aspect of fiduciary duties is the duty of care, where directors aspire to become in-
formed of all information reasonably available before making decisions yet are not liable unless 
their failure to do so amounts to gross negligence. 
204. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–56 (Del. 1985) (autho-
rizing the board to consider shareholder and non-shareholder interests at stake in considering 
whether the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders requires directors to pursue a takeo-
ver bid). 
205. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) 
(“This broad mandate [referring to the board’s authority to manage a corporation’s business and 
affairs under title 8, section 141(a) of the Delaware Code] includes a conferred authority to set a 
corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability.”); TW 
Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 2, 1989) (indicating that the board, outside of Revlon mode, has a duty to the corporation and 
its shareholders to seek long-term values). 
206. Still, some of these decisions suggest that the corporation’s and stockholders’ interests in 
profitability are only aligned in the long-term. See, e.g., TW Services, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (“I 
take it as non-controversial that, under established and conventional conceptions, directors owe 
duties of loyalty to the corporation and to the shareholders; that this conjunctive expression is not 
usually problematic because the interests of shareholders as a class are seen as congruent with those 
of the corporation in the long run . . . .”). 
207. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946, 949–51. 
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shares to Mesa pursuant to its two-tiered coercive tender offer.208 In that 
case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Unocal board had a 
“fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, 
which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived.”209 This 
language, as well as other consistent language in this opinion, shows that 
the court viewed the interest of stockholders as simply one component of 
the interest of the corporation. Moreover, the court authorized the board, 
in evaluating Unocal’s interest, to consider the interests of its constituen-
cies other than shareholders and referred specifically to the interests of 
creditors, customers, employees, and the community for this purpose.210 
This suggests that the interests of non-stockholder constituents might 
differ from the interests of stockholders, for if they were the same, there 
would be no need to authorize the board to consider them independently. 
Still, the court did not indicate what the interests of these constituencies 
were and instead deferred to the board to make that determination.211 
Moreover, the court in Unocal did not indicate that the board could 
place the interests of non-shareholder constituents above—or even on 
equal footing to—the interests of stockholders. And in fact the court sub-
sequently indicated in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc. that the board can only consider the interests of non-stockholder 
constituents so long as they are “rationally related” to the interests of 
stockholders in profit maximization.212 While this statement in Revlon 
was likely dicta,213 subsequent cases citing to this proposition from Rev-
lon indicates judicial support for it, even where a corporation is not in 
“Revlon” mode.214 
                                                     
208. See id. at 949–51. 
209. Id. at 954 (emphasis added); see Stout, supra note 194, at 170 (arguing that this language 
shows that the corporation and stockholders are not the same under the duty of loyalty). 
210. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
211. See id. 
212. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (referring to Unocal for the proposition that a board may 
have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities under Unocal, provided 
there are “rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders”). 
213. The statement was likely dicta as the holding in Revlon applies only where the sale of 
control of a corporation is inevitable (and thus the board may not consider the interests of non-
stockholders). 
214. See, e.g., In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 999 n.32 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(indicating that the portion of the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Revlon restricting directors 
to consider non-shareholder constituencies’ interests only where those interests are rationally related 
to some benefit to stockholders tempered language in Unocal, but also suggesting that this limita-
tion only applies in the context of a decision to sell a company under Revlon). The notion that the 
interests of the stockholders are primary, and the interests of other constituents secondary, can be 
traced back to as early as 1919, when the Michigan Supreme Court decided Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). In that case, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “[a] business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” Id. at 684 (em-
phasis added); see Stout, supra note 194, at 165 (arguing that Dodge v. Ford is routinely employed 
as the only legal authority for the proposition that corporate law requires corporations to have a 
legal duty to put shareholders’ interests above all others). But see Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read 
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Nor was the board in Unocal or in the other discussed cases required 
to consider non-shareholders’ interests. At most, the courts simply per-
mitted the boards to consider those interests. While the courts have not 
explained why this consideration is only permissive despite the fact that 
fiduciary duties seemingly require a consideration of the corporation’s 
interest as well as stockholders’ interest, logic and intuition suggest that 
it is due to the fact that the discussed cases were decided in the takeover 
context. In that context, the interest of stockholders is most likely to di-
verge from the interest of other corporate constituents, for the former 
would be expected to favor any takeover proposal that promised 
proceeds in excess of investors’ perceived intrinsic values, while the lat-
ter would likely disfavor any proposal that meant discontinuance of the 
firm.215 Perhaps for similar reasons, the courts in the discussed takeover 
cases did not require that the boards fix any particular time period for 
achievement of the corporate purpose.216 Again, this is likely due to the 
fact that in the takeover context, the board is faced with the decision of 
whether or not to abandon the corporation’s long-term strategy in favor 
of a short-term sale. Thus the takeover context seems to necessitate a 
broad conferral of discretion on the board as to the interests to be consi-
dered and corporate purpose to be achieved. 
If this is indeed the rationale for this broad conferral of discretion on 
the board, then we might expect to see judicial guidance indicating that 
outside of the takeover context, boards must consider the best interest of 
the corporation and its stockholders in the long-term in discharging its 
fiduciary duties, for there would be no competing short-term option. In-
deed a number of courts have suggested a judicial preference for 
directors to manage for the long-term.217 Yet they generally do not re-
                                                     
of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 177, 178–79 (2008) (noting 
that the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance are consistent with Dodge v. 
Ford’s core lesson that corporate officers and directors have a duty to manage the corporation for 
the purpose of maximizing profits for the benefit of shareholders, and arguing that profit maximiza-
tion is only a default rule). 
215. See discussion infra Part IV.  
216. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) 
(“[T]he question of ‘long-term’ versus ‘short-term’ values is largely irrelevant because directors, 
generally, are obliged to chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard 
to a fixed investment horizon.”). 
217. See, e.g., TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 WL 
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“[D]irectors, in managing the business and affairs of the cor-
poration, may find it prudent (and are authorized) to make decisions that are expected to promote 
corporate (and shareholder) long run interests, even if short run share value can be expected to be 
negatively affected . . . .”). Other academics have also observed that the Delaware courts seem to 
favor the long-term. See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The 
Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521, 527 (2002) (inferring from Revlon that 
directors should seek to maximize long-term shareholder value where a corporation is not in Revlon 
mode). 
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quire it.218 Thus absent a takeover, courts still defer to the board to de-
cide the time period over which the goal of profitability is to be 
achieved.219 That means that the board must decide whether to achieve 
the goal of profitability over a six-month period, year period, five year 
period, or some other time period, so long as that time period is justifia-
ble under the corporation’s business plan.220 
But this lack of judicial guidance absent a takeover proposal would 
seem to permit directors to make decisions that are primarily aimed at 
generating short-term profits, even where that comes at the expense of 
long-term profitability to the detriment of long-term shareholders and 
other corporate constituents. Normatively, then, we must ask—should 
directors have this absolute discretion where no takeover proposal is 
pending, or should fiduciary duty law require directors to manage corpo-
rations in that context for the long-term? For some, the answer to this 
question depends on whether the interests of shareholders and the corpo-
ration are in fact aligned in the long-term, as so often is presumed to be 
true. For if they are indeed aligned in the long-term, then the board could 
discharge this duty to both stockholders and non-stockholders simulta-
neously. It is to this point that I turn to next. 
IV. The Interests of the Corporation and its Stockholders 
are Aligned in the Long-Term 
As Part III reveals, under existing fiduciary duty law, directors may 
make business decisions that are designed to yield short-term profits, 
even if that comes at the expense of long-term profitability. That is be-
cause Delaware fiduciary duty confers on directors discretion to decide 
the time horizon for achievement of the corporate purpose of profitabili-
ty. Yet some Delaware jurists have indicated that directors should 
manage for the long-term.221 As is discussed in Part III, this seems to be 
based, at least in part, on their assumption that in the long-term, stock-
holders’ and non-stockholders’ interests are aligned.222 In this Part IV, I 
analyze whether the interests of stockholders and non-stockholders are  
                                                     
218. But see Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the obligation 
of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s 
stockholders . . . .”). 
219. See, e.g., Hahn v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 1987 WL 18429, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 1987) 
(“While reasonable men may disagree as to whether long-term growth objectives should prevail 
over short-term profit considerations, the decision to pursue a long range objective is a business 
decision subject to a presumption of propriety under the business judgment rule.”). 
220. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 571 A.2d at 1154 (“Directors are not obliged to abandon 
a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no 
basis to sustain the corporate strategy.”). 
221. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
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indeed aligned in the long-term. I begin by analyzing the interests of 
stockholders (Section A) and then turn to the interests of the corporation, 
represented, in addition to stockholders, by its non-stockholder constitu-
ents (Section B). 
A. Stockholders’ Interest In Long-Term Profitability 
As is discussed in Part III, stockholders are considered to be residual 
beneficiaries.223 That means that on dissolution, they receive the value of 
a corporation’s assets in excess of its liabilities.224 A corporation’s assets 
grow with the accumulation of corporate profits.225 Thus shareholders 
clearly have an interest in a corporation’s profitability.226 Stockholders’ 
receipt of periodic dividends also explains their interest in profitability, 
for dividends are generally paid out of a corporation’s profits.227 The 
more profits a corporation generates, the greater the likelihood that those 
profits will be in excess of what the company needs to operate and will 
be distributed to stockholders.228 
But do investors have an interest in a firm’s long-term profitability? If 
the efficient capital market hypothesis were true, then certainly investors 
would want a corporation to generate profits on a sustained basis, for 
that would mean the corporation would be generating cash flows into the 
future, thereby leading to a high intrinsic value calculated from those 
cash flows.229 But as I argue in Part I.A., investors have reasons to want 
profits to be generated in the short-term even where that might impair 
long-term profitability, given the short-term bias inherent in stock prices 
resulting from information imperfections, as well as investor behavioral 
                                                     
223. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
226. This may not be true for investors who have hedged away their economic interest. The in-
terests of those investors will be ignored for purposes of this analysis, not because they do not exist, 
but because there are clear policy reasons why corporations should not be managed with their inter-
ests in mind.  
227. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 362 (2007) (“As a general rule, dividends can be declared and 
paid out of net profits only . . . .”). While dividends are typically declared and paid out of profits, in 
Delaware they may be declared even where a corporation does not have profits out of a corpora-
tion’s surplus. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170 (2001). Surplus generally refers to the amount by 
which a corporation’s net assets (its assets minus its liabilities) exceed the amount determined by 
the board to constitute “capital.” See id. at § 154. Generally “capital” is at least equal to the number 
of shares issued in all subscriptions multiplied by those shares’ par values. See id. 
228. While the fact that a corporation has generated a high level of profits increases the 
chances that the board will pay those profits out as dividends, it does not mean that a board is obli-
gated to do so. In fact, boards are not required to pay dividends except where the failure to do so 
amounts to an abuse of discretion. Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group Inc., 479 A.2d 276, 280 (Del. 
1984) (citing Eshleman v. Keenan, 194 A. 40, 43 (Del. Ch. 1937)). 
229. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
Grossman%20Final_C[1]  9/3/2010 2:25 PM 
950 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 43:4 
deviations from rationality.230 Still, some investors—particularly those 
who hold their shares for a longer period of time—are less interested in 
short-term spikes in stock prices, for they do not trade their shares in the 
short-term to capitalize on those price fluctuations.231 Those investors, in 
contrast, likely calculate firms’ intrinsic values in a way that is more ref-
lective of the long-term. Moreover, significant institutional investors 
often take a long-term view to their investments out of necessity, for 
they inevitably will, on repeated occasions, hold stock in the same 
firms.232 Thus it seems investors may diverge in the period over which 
they seek corporate profitability.233  
Delaware courts recognize that not all shareholders have the same in-
terests.234 And they have authorized the board to favor the interests of 
long-term shareholders over short-term, speculative shareholders where 
a corporation is not “for sale” under Revlon.235 Perhaps that is because 
they believe long-term investors’ interests are more reflective of “share-
holders’ interests” under the fiduciary duty analysis, given that those 
investors’ investment decisions more truly reflect corporations’ intrinsic 
values.236 Consistent with that view, “shareholders’ interest” would be in 
the generation of sustainable profits, for that would lead to the highest 
potential pay-out to shareholders. 
B. The Corporation’s Interest in Long-Term Profitability 
We must first identify who the corporation is before we can determine 
whether the “corporation” has an interest in long-term profitability. 
Guidance on this emerges from Unocal, where the Delaware Supreme 
                                                     
230. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
231. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
232. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
233. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 6, at 1283–92 (arguing that investors have disparate in-
terests, including as to investment horizon). 
234. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386 (Del. 1995) (citing Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 1994)); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 
A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (“It is well established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not 
always be treated equally for all purposes.”). In fact, this aspect of fiduciary duty law also seems to 
have been accepted by the Delaware legislature through its passage of an anti-takeover statute which 
limits certain rights only of a tender offerors but not other stockholders. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 
§ 203 (2001). 
235. See, e.g., TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427 & 10298, 1989 WL 
20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). A number of academics also support managing for the long-
term. See, e.g., Velasco, supra note 92, at 454 (arguing that social responsibility theory has per-
suaded much of society that many conflicts between shareholder and non-shareholders arise only 
from a short-term perspective and their interests may merge in a long-term perspective because of 
the benefits of harmonious and productive relationships). 
236. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (indicating that Delaware courts understand 
that the stock market may be inefficient in failing to reflect the long-term value of a corporation). 
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Court appears to have held that the corporation’s interest is represented 
by the interests of its various constituents.237 The court in that case also 
identified the types of constituents (in addition to shareholders) that 
boards may consider when assessing the interest of the corporation, spe-
cifying creditors, customers, employees, and the community.238 While 
the Court indicated that this was a non-exclusive listing, these seem to 
be the most commonly identified non-shareholder corporate constitu-
ents.239 Thus the following analysis will look to these constituents to 
identify whether they are interested in long-term profitability. 
1. Creditors 
Creditors of a corporation are persons to whom the corporation owes 
money or other property.240 Creditors are typically thought of as being 
either trade creditors, to whom the corporation owes money in connec-
tion with its purchase of goods and services, or borrowed money 
creditors, from whom the corporation borrows money for its opera-
tions.241 
It seems clear that a creditor’s primary interest is for a corporation to 
be able to repay its debts to the creditor as they become due.242 That 
means that every creditor wants the corporation to be financially suc-
cessful, at least over the term of the debt, to be able to repay the debt 
according to its terms. In fact the more profitable a corporation is, the 
less any creditor has to worry about a potential risk of the corporation 
not being able to repay its debts to the creditor and other potentially se-
nior and pari passu creditors. Moreover, both types of creditors would 
likely also want a corporation to grow so that it would either need to buy 
larger amounts of goods and services on credit, in the case of trade credi-
tors, or borrow larger sums, thereby generating higher interest income, in 
                                                     
237. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting, as the 
second element of the standard of proof for board adoption of defensive measures to a takeover 
offer, a balancing of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise, and for purposes of 
weighing the interest of the corporate enterprise, authorizing the board to consider the impact on 
constituencies other than shareholders). 
238. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
239. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 287 (Del. Ch. 1989) 
(adopting the listing of non-shareholder constituents set forth in Unocal); see also Eric W. Orts, 
Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 14, 16 
(1992) (noting these as the constituents typically identified by state constituency statutes). 
240. Black’s Law Dictionary 424 (9th ed. 2009). 
241. See Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dis-
missal on the Basis of “Substantial Abuse,” 5 J.L. & Com. 1, 87 (1984) (“Businesses, whether in 
the form of sole proprietorships, partnerships, or corporations, generally contemplate and depend on 
sustained relationships with trade creditors and commercial lenders . . . .”). 
242. See Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Com-
merce, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 943, 948 (2007). 
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the case of borrowed money creditors.243 Thus creditors indeed seem to 
be primarily interested in sustained corporate profitability.244 
2. Customers 
Customers are primarily interested in obtaining quality products and 
services at low prices. Repeat customers, or customers who tend to buy 
the same products and services from the same suppliers, undoubtedly 
want a corporation that they buy those goods and services from to con-
tinue to exist so that it continues to supply them with quality goods and 
services.245 That means that they inherently want a corporation to be 
profitable so that its continued existence is justified. A corporation that is 
profitable is also more likely to reinvest those profits in new and im-
proved products and services, which also runs to the benefit of repeat as 
well as single-time customers. 
Moreover, to the extent that a corporation’s products come with a 
warranty, customers undoubtedly want the corporation to remain in 
business and have profits, at least so that the corporation has assets 
beyond its senior liabilities to satisfy its warranty obligations to the cus-
tomers.  
Thus all customers would seem to desire a corporation that to some 
extent is profitable on a sustainable basis. Still, customers are not neces-
sarily interested in a corporation maximizing its profits, as that likely 
means that the profits came at their expense through high prices paid on 
consumed products and services. Thus customers, like creditors, would 
likely favor a corporation to be profitable on a sustained basis, but would 
likely favor a lower level of profitability than creditors, at least to the 
extent profits came at their expense. 
3. Employees 
Employees are primarily concerned with maintaining their jobs and 
getting good compensation and other benefits over the course of that 
employment. In addition, employees undoubtedly seek to obtain intangi-
ble benefits from their jobs, such as praise and enhanced knowledge. 
                                                     
243. Id. at 948–49 (noting that a creditor, like an equity investor, may expect indirect gains 
from its investment, including the benefit of future investment relationships). 
244. This is true despite the fact that creditor and stockholders likely have different tolerances 
for risk, particularly in the zone of insolvency. See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 
863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 2004). Yet as the Delaware Chancery Court has pointed out, even 
in that context, both stockholders and creditors are interested in increasing the economic value of 
the firm. Id. at 792. 
245. This reduces transaction costs of having to repeatedly research new suppliers. 
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This, in turn, means that employees generally want a corporation to be 
financially successful and to continue in existence, so that it may contin-
ue to serve as an employer and provider of those benefits. In fact, 
employees would be expected to want a corporation to be highly profita-
ble, as some portion of those profits would likely trickle down to them. 
That would be especially true for employees who have a portion of their 
compensation tied to the corporation’s success, whether through a cash 
bonus plan, stock option plan, or other plan tied to the firm’s success. 
Moreover, to the extent that a corporation views itself as a value-creating 
enterprise in the long-term, it would be expected to treat its employees 
better, investing more resources in their education, health, and safety to 
yield returns over the long-term.246 That is not to say that just because an 
employer is successful on a continuing basis, every employee will retain 
her job and receive good benefits—there are a number of other reasons, 
such as job performance, that factor into an employee’s compensation 
and retention. However it seems intuitive that an employer is much more 
likely to pay better benefits and retain employees when it is continuing 
on a long-term path of profitability. Thus it seems clear that employees 
would also seem to want a corporation to be profitable on a sustainable 
basis.247 
Still, some employees who receive a high level of compensation 
based on short-term profits would likely be willing to forego some level 
of future profits, and risk corporate longevity, in exchange for short-term 
profits.248 That is not to say that they are not interested in future prof-
its—but simply that they would likely support decisions that lead to 
profits in the near term rather than sustained profits over the long-term 
given the large size of their pay package, the time value of money, and 
the uncertainty of future profits and continued employment.249 Yet it 
seems unreasonable for any employee to expect to be compensated for 
short-term profits that either derive from accounting manipulations or 
from decisions that do not properly reflect the risks inherent in them. 
                                                     
246. See Sanford M. Jacoby, The Future of Labor and Finance, 30 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 
111, 116 (2008) (“When shareholders and business strategies are guided by long-term considera-
tions, they will, allegedly, encourage the treatment of employees not a [sic] cost but as an asset 
deserving of training, job security, and fair treatment that promotes low turnover and high produc-
tivity. A focus on the long-term also encourages companies to pay attention to future liabilities in 
areas such as employment regulation . . . .”). 
247. This proposition may not be as true for independent contractors, which are increasingly 
used by firms to avoid having to pay unemployment and other benefits. See Stephen F. Befort, The 
Regulatory Void of Contingent Work, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 235, 246 (2006). Still, even 
independent contractors would likely be able to obtain more attractive compensation packages and 
other benefits from, and be retained on a more consistent basis by, a firm that was profitable on a 
sustainable basis. 
248. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
249. This is similar to the conflict between long-term stockholders and short-term stockhold-
ers. 
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This is apparent from the many public tongue-lashings received by ex-
ecutives in the midst of the financial crisis whose compensation was 
high despite large firm losses,250 as well as from the number of investor 
and policy-maker calls for reform of this pay practice.251 Thus while we 
cannot conclude that this entire class of constituent favors long-term 
profitability, the executive compensation movement suggests that we 
discount those interests created by inflated, short-term compensation 
arrangements. 
4. Community 
Identifying who makes up the community where a corporation oper-
ates is no simple task, for that undoubtedly depends on the nature of the 
business and where it is located.252 But as a general matter, individuals 
who live where a corporation conducts its operations presumably want a 
corporation to contribute as much economically to the community as 
possible. This includes, perhaps first and foremost, paying taxes year 
after year so that the community can consistently count on, and use, 
those tax revenues for local services and civic projects.253 It also means 
consistently supplying good jobs so that local individuals can make a 
living and communities can consistently maintain their citizenry and tax-
paying base.254 Both of these occur where a corporation is profitable on a 
sustained basis, for only then will it be able to continue to supply local 
jobs. Obviously the more profitable a corporation is, the higher the 
amount of taxes it pays, thereby contributing more resources to the 
community for local services and civic projects. 
                                                     
250. See e.g., Louise Story, Wall St. Profits Were a Mirage, but Huge Bonuses Were Real, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2008, at A1 (noting the enormous size of the 2006 bonuses Merrill Lynch paid 
to its CEO and traders, even though Merrill’s earnings for that year turned out to be a mirage and 
noting criticism of pay practices which awarded large bonuses based on ephemeral earnings). 
251. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
252. State constituency statutes, as well as academic commentary, suggest that the relevant 
community to consider is that where the corporation operates. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:6-
1(2)(b) (West 2003) (indicating that in making business decisions, the board may consider “the 
effects of the action on the community in which the corporation operates” (emphasis added)); N.Y. 
Bus. Corp. Law § 717(b)(2) (McKinney 2003) (indicating that in making business decisions, the 
board may consider, among other things, the communities in which the corporation does business); 
Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1156, 1172 
(1993) (analyzing what the community’s interest is by reference to the community where the corpo-
ration’s plant or office is located). 
253. See Ryan J. York, Comment, Visages of Janus: The Heavy Burden of Other Constituency 
Anti-Takeover Statutes on Shareholders and the Efficient Market for Corporate Control, 38  
Willamette L. Rev. 187, 197 (2002) (identifying as the community’s only identifiable interests the 
payment of taxes and the supply of local jobs). 
254. Id. 
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To be sure, some “community” constituents might not be interested in 
a corporation’s profitability. For instance, environmental groups would 
want a corporation to shut down its operations that have an adverse im-
pact on the environment, regardless of the impact of that move on the 
corporation’s profits.255 But it would seem to undermine the exercise of 
determining the community’s interest if we focused on the interests of 
the few exceptional interest groups rather than the larger community of 
interests who fit within this constituency class. Moreover, by focusing 
on those who live where the corporation operates, it seems legislatures 
that have adopted constituency statutes have decided to focus on the 
community interests identified above rather than on more general or 
global interests. 
C. Summary 
As the foregoing discussion shows, shareholders want a corporation 
to be profitable. While some shareholders would prefer that those profits 
be realized in the short-term, shareholders who are less influenced by 
market imperfections causing a short-term bias undoubtedly seek a cor-
poration to generate profits on a sustainable basis. It is this class of 
shareholders that courts expressly authorize boards to prefer when ana-
lyzing whether board decisions were in fact in the best interest of 
shareholders. In any case, even for short-term shareholders, it would cer-
tainly be in their interest for a corporation to be profitable in the long-
term, even if they have specious reasons to favor short-term profits. 
Moreover, non-shareholders generally also want corporations to be 
profitable in the long-term, for those corporations are most able and apt 
to compensate their employees well over time and provide other em-
ployee benefits. They can also satisfy their warranty obligations owed to 
customers and continue to supply customers with new and improved 
products and services. Profitable corporations have more resources with 
which to repay creditors, and if they are profitable on a sustainable basis, 
may provide creditors with additional lending opportunities. Needless to 
say, corporations with sustainable profits continuously pay higher taxes 
and employ more local people, which benefits the citizens who live in 
the communities where those taxes are paid and jobs are made available. 
                                                     
255. Yet they, too, might want a corporation to generate profits, if the corporation would use 
those profits to not only remediate the corporation’s adverse impacts on the environment, but to 
actually improve the condition of the environment.  
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V. Reformulating Fiduciary Duties So That They Require Directors to 
Act in the Long-Term Best Interest of  
the Stockholders and the Corporation 
As is discussed in Part IV, by and large all of a corporation’s consti-
tuencies—shareholders and non-shareholders alike—seem to share some 
commonality of interest—they all seek a corporation that is profitable on 
a sustained basis. In fact a number of Delaware courts have recognized 
this coincidence of interests on profitability over the long-term. Moreo-
ver, Section II provides a strong policy argument in favor of supporting 
corporations that are managed to generate wealth for the good of inves-
tors and society in the long-term. Yet as the discussion in Part III reveals, 
Delaware courts give boards wide discretion to decide over what time 
period a corporation should be managed for the purpose of generating 
profits. Consistently, outside of the Revlon sale context, they also give 
boards wide discretion to decide whether to consider non-stockholders’ 
interests in making business decisions. However, because of this discre-
tion, directors are more susceptible to influence by interest groups such 
as short-term investors and executives, who benefit from decisions that 
yield short-term profits.  
Given what seems to be a strong policy in favor of managing for the 
long-term, and the fact that corporate law reflects policy,256 I believe 
corporate law should implement that policy through fiduciary duties. My 
proposal for doing so is set out in Section A. Section A also explains 
why I propose implementing this long-term agenda through fiduciary 
duties as well as how this proposal would effectively be implemented. 
Then in Section B I set out and respond to a number of likely critiques. 
A. My Proposal 
To implement the strong public policy in favor of corporations that 
are managed for the long-term, as well as the general coincidence of 
corporate interest in the long-term, I propose that directors be required to 
make decisions primarily for the purpose of advancing the long-term 
best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. That means that 
every time the board is faced with a business decision, it would need to 
consider how that would benefit the corporation and the stockholders in 
the long-term, and make decisions that are aimed at achieving that objec-
tive. In effect that would mean that directors would need to determine 
how every business decision implemented the corporation’s business 
plan, for the business plan sets out the corporation’s long-term objectives 
                                                     
256. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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as well as strategies to achieve those objectives.257 That would not mean 
that the board must shape corporate strategy such that a corporation fo-
regoes all opportunities to make current profits—but it would mean that 
realizing on current profits could not undermine the corporation’s ability 
to generate profits in the future in accordance with its business plan. 
Under my proposal, board decisions would continue to be protected 
by the business judgment rule.258 That would mean that directors would 
continue to be protected in deciding how to achieve long-term profitabil-
ity under the business plan, as well as how to allocate profits among the 
various corporate constituents. But clarifying that fiduciary duties are 
mandatorily long-term in nature outside of the takeover context would 
force directors to conduct analyses (in compliance with their duty of 
care) that would enable them to decide whether each business decision 
would be primarily beneficial to the corporation and the stockholders in 
the long-term—and their failure to do so could amount to a conscious 
disregard of their duties and thus an act in bad faith. This, then, could 
lead to a breach of the duty of loyalty.259 That would likely mean that 
directors would have to increasingly consider non-financial factors in 
making decisions, for the long-term often cannot be summed up in a neat 
financial calculation.260 But the challenge of valuing the long-term ef-
fects of corporate decisions should not preclude their primary 
importance. 
Because this reformulated duty would only require directors to pri-
marily act in the long-term best interest of stockholders and the 
corporation, directors could, in compliance with this duty, consider the 
interests of short-term stockholders in making business decisions. This 
would give directors some flexibility in making business decisions that 
are intended to deliver short-term profits. However, it would not permit 
them to place those short-term interests above, or even on par with, the 
interests of stockholders and other corporate constituents in sustained 
corporate profitability. Because stockholder and non-stockholder consti-
tuents’ interests converge in the long-term, this interpretation would also 
seem to more faithfully implement the long-standing construction of di-
rectors’ fiduciary duties, which require that directors consider the 
interests of stockholders as well as the interest of the corporation. 
One may ask why the board—rather than some other constituent—
should as an initial matter be charged with implementing the corporate 
                                                     
257. This proposal is similar to one component of a proposal made by Professor John Mathe-
son and Brent Olson over 15 years ago. See infra notes 269–71 and accompanying text. 
258. See supra note 181 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business judgment rule. 
259. See supra Part III for a discussion of how a conscious disregard of duties can lead to lia-
bility for a breach of the duty of loyalty. 
260. See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the limits of financial statements to capture a 
firm’s performance.  
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purpose of long-term profitability. For one, the board is the body that 
oversees adoption and implementation of a corporation’s business plan. 
The business plan is the source of the corporation’s long-term profit-
making strategy. Thus it makes sense for the board to be charged with 
implementing the corporate purpose through its oversight of the business 
planning process. The fact that boards are generally comprised of highly 
respected and knowledgeable businessmen and women would only make 
discussions about long-term profit-making strategies more meaning-
ful.261 Moreover, the board is already charged with the duty to act in the 
best interest of the corporation and its stockholders under its fiduciary 
duties. To the extent that any constraints are imposed on what amounts 
to the best interest of the corporation and stockholders, they would nec-
essarily need to be reflected through a modification to those fiduciary 
duties. And this proposal would be consistent with the notion from Rev-
lon that any temporal limit on directors’ discretion in making business 
decisions should be imposed on directors through their fiduciary duties. 
A related question pertains to why the common law of fiduciary du-
ties—rather than legislation—is the appropriate means to implement a 
long-term corporate agenda. Initially it is important to note that my pro-
posal does not purport to “fix” in its entirety the “problem” of short-
termism. There are undoubtedly complementary steps that could—and 
should—be taken to shift the focus of corporations towards long-term 
profitability. But my proposal is intended to be the first guiding step 
down that path, for it would seem backwards to implement a long-term 
policy objective through specific legislative or regulatory changes before 
that policy objective is manifested through corporate governance stan-
dards.262 Moreover, given the limitless ways in which corporations can 
                                                     
261. See also Greenfield, supra note 164, at 957 (referring to literature which finds that the 
benefits of group decision-making are significant and that groups in many cases outperform indi-
viduals, and noting that the corporate structure takes advantage of this through placing the board as 
decision-maker at the top). 
262. To some extent, this is already happening with respect to compensation. In that context, 
the federal government and regulatory agencies are issuing a patchwork of rules and regulations 
designed to curb compensation practices that reward executives and others for short-term profit-
making activities that compromise long-term profitability. See supra notes 135–43 and accompany-
ing text. In my view, it would make much more sense if these efforts followed a shift in corporate 
governance standards reflecting the corporate policy of long-term profitability, such that these regu-
lations were simply implementing a corporate mandate pertaining to corporations’ internal affairs. 
That would not only provide a more coherent framework by which corporations would be operated 
(rather than specific legislation targeted at one aspect of short-termism), but it would also guide 
legislators in designing legislation aimed at furthering that purpose. Understandably, in the current 
environment, legislators felt compelled to do something to curb lavish pay packages at financial 
institutions despite poor long-term results. However, in my view, before Congress and regulatory 
agencies head too far in the direction of detailed regulation to address specific manifestations of 
short-termism, Delaware courts should take the opportunity to clarify what is the object of each 
director’s fiduciary’s duties—of producing sustainable profits for the benefit of the corporation and 
its shareholders. That, then, can serve as a guide not only to shareholders in enforcing directors’ 
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achieve long-term profitability in light of their unique business struc-
tures and strategies, it seems to make sense to use, at least as an initial 
matter, the standards-based approach offered by fiduciary duties to im-
plement the long-term mandate rather than a narrower, rules-based 
approach typically associated with legislation.263 This change would also 
ensure that state law regulating internal affairs remains relevant in the 
current environment of short-term investor activism. However, once my 
proposal is implemented, in my view it would then make sense to con-
sider targeted ways—for example through tax incentives or penalties, 
new disclosure rules, or changes to the corporate voting mechanism—to 
implement the then clear corporate objective of generating sustainable 
profits, at all times being sensitive to the welcome differences between 
corporations and the ways in which they may achieve that objective. 
This reinterpretation of the corporate purpose would also provide di-
rectors with much-needed guidance as to how to discharge their 
fiduciary duties, particularly in an era where they are faced with pres-
sures from executives as well as from investors to make decisions that 
generate short-term profits. As the Delaware Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged, one of the objectives of Delaware fiduciary duty law is to 
provide directors with “clear signal beacons and brightly lined-channel 
markers as they navigate with due care, good faith, and loyalty on behalf 
of a Delaware corporation and its shareholders.”264 This proposal would 
in fact provide some clarity as to what corporate purposes directors must 
seek to achieve. This, in turn, should enhance accountability of directors 
to shareholders, for removing an element of discretion from the board 
gives shareholders a more clearly defined standard to which to hold di-
rectors accountable. And since the reformulated duty would lead 
directors to act in the interest of both shareholders and the corporation, 
shareholders (at least long-term shareholders) would indeed serve as a 
proxy for the corporation in enforcing this duty, for doing so would be in 
the interest of both. 
Still, this reformulation of fiduciary duties would not apply in all con-
texts. Specifically, because the reformulated duty would require directors 
to consider how to maximize profits under the corporation’s long-term 
strategy, it would not apply in the context where the board was faced 
with a potential takeover or other similar sale transaction in which the 
future of the corporation was being questioned.265 Indeed it is in that 
context that the board is deciding the very question of whether or not to 
                                                     
fiduciary duties, but also to legislators and regulators in developing necessary laws and regulations 
that seek to further that purpose. 
263. In addition, in Delaware, fiduciary duties are a matter of common law, so it would not 
make sense to impose a limit on directors’ duties through state legislation. 
264. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). 
265. This would also be true with respect to the corporation’s dissolution. 
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scrap the corporation’s long-term strategy in favor of a sale.266 Thus in 
that context it makes sense to continue to permit directors to consider not 
only the long-term interests of stockholders and the corporation, but also 
their short-term interests. Again, this might explain why the cases dis-
cussed in Part III give directors such broad discretion as to the temporal 
element of their fiduciary duties. 
That is not to turn a blind eye to the fact that the market for corporate 
control plays a large role in the problem of short-termism that I have 
identified. But it is rather to acknowledge that different aspects of the 
short-termism problem may require different fixes, and that my proposed 
fix addressed one source (though not the only source) of the short-
termism problem. It also has the added benefit of approaching the short-
termism problem in an incremental way, with the goal both of increasing 
the chances of adoption as well as providing an opportunity to reflect on 
the impact of the proposal without too many major shifts in the law at 
once.267 Thus again, my proposal might complement other legal changes 
that would implement a policy promoting sustainable wealth-creation. 
Perhaps the best way to see how my recommendation would be im-
plemented is by example. Let us suppose that the business plan 
(determined by management subject to board oversight) of a widget 
manufacturing corporation called Widget Co., with operations in the 
western United States, includes expanding its operations into the Mid-
west in the subsequent five year period. Let us also suppose that an 
activist investor of Widget Co., Active Investor, sends a demand letter to 
the board of Widget Co. demanding the sale of dormant manufacturing 
assets and the distribution of the proceeds from that sale to shareholders. 
Under existing law, Widget Co.’s board could make the decision to 
comply with Activist Investor’s demands simply on the basis that it 
would benefit investors in the short-term. In fact the board might follow 
this course of action to avoid seeming uncooperative with Activist Inves-
tor. Moreover, officers might support (and push for) this sale if their 
compensation was tied in any way to profits generated by this transac-
tion. However, suppose that the assets requested to be sold would be 
                                                     
266. This would generally include mergers, asset sales, exchange offers, and tender offers, 
where shareholders would receive cash or other property in consideration for their equity interests, 
resulting either in a significant change in the capital structure of the corporation or in the disappear-
ance of the corporation. See Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the 
“Responsible” Shareholder, 10 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 31, 35–36 (2005) (identifying as the para-
digmatic situations in which stockholders’ and other constituencies’ interests diverge as the hostile 
takeover context and financial distress); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Frame-
work for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 605–06 (1992) 
(describing transactions involving substantial distributions of wealth to stockholders as one class of 
transaction in which conflicts between stockholders and non-stockholder constituents most com-
monly arise). 
267. Though arguably all of the new executive compensation rules might impair our ability to 
assess and measure independently the impact of this proposal on the problem of short-termism. 
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perfect for Widget Co.’s expansion into the Midwest, and that buying 
equivalent assets in the future would be very costly. Thus perhaps the 
board’s decision to sell them would not be in the best interest of Widget 
Co. and its stockholders, at least in the long-term. Under my proposal, to 
comply with its fiduciary duties, the board would need to determine 
whether selling those assets would lead to enhanced profitability in the 
long-term (as compared to not selling those assets and retaining them for 
future use). To do that, the board would need to look at Widget Co.’s 
business plan as well as at how selling the assets would impact that 
business plan in the future.268 If, after this analysis, the board decided 
that Widget Co’s business plan and long-term profit-making strategy 
would be more effectively implemented by selling off the assets and 
buying different assets in the Midwest, and that Widget Co. did not need 
those proceeds for other projected expenditures under the business plan, 
then it should proceed with the course of action requested by Activist 
Investor. If, however, the board decided that Widget Co.’s business plan 
and long-term profit-making strategy would be more effectively imple-
mented by keeping the dormant assets until they were needed for the 
expansion, then it should proceed in that fashion. In either case, under 
my proposal, the board would need to consider Widget Co.’s long-term 
business plan and how each course of action would have implemented 
that plan and Widget Co.’s ability to generate profits over time to comp-
ly with its fiduciary duties. 
My proposal is similar to one component of a proposal made by Pro-
fessor John Matheson and Brent Olson over 15 years ago.269 However, 
the goal of Matheson’s and Olson’s proposal appears to have been to 
provide long-term shareholders with the incentive and ability to monitor 
the board with respect to conflict-of-interest and fundamental transac-
tions.270 According to Matheson and Olson, by giving institutional 
investors—seen as the quintessential long-term shareholder—a more 
meaningful voice in governance, those investors will have a greater in-
centive to view their holding as long-term, as they will no longer feel 
locked out of the governance process.271 My proposal also seeks to focus 
directors on the long-term. However, my proposal places the impetus on 
the board, as the fulcrum of the corporate business lever, to reflect the 
long-term interests of stockholders and the corporation. The board is 
                                                     
268. Obviously the board, in making this determination, would need to consider the likelihood 
of the expansion actually occurring and of cheaper, equivalent (or better) assets becoming available 
in the future, among other things. 
269. See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder 
Model of Corporate Governance, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1313, 1376–77 (1992) (proposing that the cor-
porate purpose be to advance the interest of the corporation and its long-term shareholders). 
270. See id. at 1315, 1376–81. 
271. Id. at 1322. 
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already obligated to act as a fiduciary to all stockholders—thus in my 
view it makes sense to charge them with implementing the long-term 
corporate agenda that is developed under their oversight rather than in-
dividual investors who generally do not owe one another fiduciary duties 
and who may have divergent interests. Moreover, my proposal attempts 
to give effect to the long-standing formulation of directors’ fiduciary 
duties as being owed both to the corporation as well as its stockholders, 
while also implementing the policy of creating long-term profitability 
for the benefit of our economy and society. Recent developments per-
taining to executive compensation practices as well as investor activism 
would also seem to make my proposal propitious. 
B. Responses to Anticipated Critique 
Let me address a number of criticisms that I anticipate will be made to 
my proposal. 
First, opponents will undoubtedly argue that my proposal removes 
from stockholders an ability to influence certain board decisions that 
they favor. The proposal would in fact do that, for it would strip from the 
board the discretion to make decisions that are primarily aimed at gene-
rating short-term profits, including where that is due to a request from a 
stockholder. That, in turn, would mean that some stockholders would 
effectively have less power to influence the board. But that is one of the 
primary purposes of the proposal—to remove from directors the discre-
tion to manage for the short-term, whether that be due to stockholder 
influence, officer influence or other reasons. Moreover, the proposal 
would give some stockholders—particularly long-term stockholders, 
more power, for it would give them a more clearly defined standard to 
which to hold director conduct. 
This leads to the second potential challenge—that this proposal could 
cause an increase in suits against boards. While it is possible that share-
holders will commence more suits against directors to enforce this more 
clearly defined standard, directors would still be protected from needless 
suits under the business judgment rule.272 Moreover, the other procedural 
protections that shield directors from needless fiduciary duty suits—such 
as the requirement that stockholders first make demand on the board un-
less demand would be excused as being futile273 and that stockholder 
plaintiffs state their claims with particularity274—would continue to ap-
                                                     
272. See supra note 181 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business judgment rule. 
273. See Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), 
available at http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=39138; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984). 
274. See Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1. 
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ply. Thus directors would realistically only face liability for failing to 
meet this new aspect of fiduciary duties where they consciously disre-
garded their charge of advancing long-term profitability, which would 
amount to bad faith and thus a breach of the duty of loyalty. Yet it is pre-
cisely in those circumstances where the board should face liability, for if 
a board is not considering how a non-takeover decision will allow a cor-
poration to implement its strategy in the long-term, the board should be 
held accountable for that failure.  
A third potential criticism is that by requiring directors to consider the 
interests of non-shareholders in making business decisions, directors 
may act contrary to the interests of shareholders. This is one of the pri-
mary concerns raised by shareholder primacists, who believe that the 
corporation should be managed solely for the benefit of shareholders. 
However, as I showed in Part IV, long-term profitability is in the interest 
of both shareholders and the corporation’s other stakeholders. Thus di-
rectors would not be acting to shareholders’ detriment by focusing on 
long-term profitability. Moreover, directors would continue to have the 
discretion to decide, as between the different corporate constituents, how 
to allocate those profits. 
Fourth, critics might argue that stockholders can simply defeat the 
long-term mandate under my proposal by replacing the board with direc-
tors who are sympathetic to their short-term demands. While 
shareholders would have the same right to remove and elect directors 
under my proposal that they currently have, they would not be able to 
elect directors simply as a means of obtaining favorable short-term ac-
tion, for every director would be obligated to manage the corporation for 
the purpose of long-term profitability. While it is true that new directors 
might persuade management to change the corporate strategy to one that 
involves removal of certain business lines (thus leading to, for example, 
the sale of assets and distribution of cash to investors), even in those 
contexts the board’s decisions would need to be part of a larger, coherent 
business strategy aimed at creating long-term wealth rather than being 
the result of an investor or officer push for short-term returns. 
Fifth, one might question whether implementing this proposal would 
lead managers to decide to reincorporate in other jurisdictions as a way 
to avoid its application.275 This argument would generally track the “race 
to the bottom” line of reasoning in that corporations would be expected 
to incorporate or reincorporate in jurisdictions with more lenient corpo-
                                                     
275. Generally reincorporating in a different jurisdiction requires approval by the board and 
stockholders. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 390(b) (2001); see also Roberta Romano, Competi-
tion for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 849 
(1993) (noting that reincorporating requires approval of stockholders). 
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rate governance standards.276 However, as many commentators have 
noted, there is no longer a race among states for incorporations, as De-
laware has clearly won that race.277 And in fact many commentators 
believe that there is not a race to the bottom at all, but rather a “race to 
the top” such that states with the most value-maximizing systems of cor-
porate governance are more likely to attract incorporations.278 Under that 
line of thinking, Delaware, if it implemented my proposal, might attract 
more incorporations (or at least would not be at risk of losing them), for 
as I argue above, it would cause directors to make decisions that are 
more reflective of a firm’s “true value” than does existing law. Moreo-
ver, if Delaware courts would implement my proposal, I would expect 
that other states would follow suit, as they often look to Delaware law 
for guidance in developing their corporate laws.279 That, in turn, would 
reduce or eliminate the prospect of reincorporating outside of Delaware 
simply to avoid application of my proposal. 
Sixth, critics might challenge whether this proposal would in fact 
change the substance of any board decision, as directors could always 
find a way to rationalize how any decision would benefit the corporation 
and stockholders in the long-term. But one of the benefits of this propos-
al is that it will force the board, under its duty of care, to become 
informed in a way that allows it to determine whether a given action will 
in fact produce long-term profits. Failing to become informed in this 
way could amount to a conscious disregard of duty and, again, an act in 
bad faith. Even ignoring the prospect of liability, most directors will un-
doubtedly opt to become informed about whether their decisions truly 
advance the goal of long-term profitability once they understand that this 
is their required objective. Thus even if the substance of board decisions 
remains difficult to regulate under the reformulated duty, the processes 
that must be undertaken for the board to decide whether an action meets 
the reformulated duty should afford much protection to long-term stock-
holders and other constituents. Moreover, even ignoring the potential for 
                                                     
276. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
Yale L.J. 663, 663–68 (1974) (arguing that states’ reliance on incorporation fees leads them to adopt 
laws that are favorable to managers over shareholders). 
277. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 
Stan. L. Rev. 679, 724 (2002) (noting that no state competes with Delaware for corporate charters); 
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588, 590 (2003). 
278. See Romano, supra note 275, at 848–49 (arguing that the race to the top theory is sup-
ported by event studies); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of 
the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 255–56 (1977) (arguing that firms that operate under a legal 
regime that does not maximize firm value would be outperformed by firms operating under a legal 
regime that did, and would therefore have lower stock prices, which would lead to the ouster of 
those managers or a takeover coupled with reincorporation in a regime that would maximize value). 
But see Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 
Cal. L. Rev. 1775 (2002) (challenging the findings of these event studies). 
279. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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liability, the proposal would serve an expressive purpose, instructing 
directors how they should perform their duties. 
Finally, critics will argue that the proposal ignores the problem of 
short-termism caused by the market for corporate control. Numerous 
academics have identified the takeover market as one of the primary rea-
sons why directors manage for the short-term.280 But it does not seem to 
be appropriate to adopt a one-size-fits-all solution to the short-term prob-
lem, particularly as takeover decisions involve a challenge to a 
corporation’s long-term business objectives that are not present for non-
takeover decisions. Yet there are many pressures on boards to be short-
termists outside of the takeover context that should be addressed, partic-
ularly given the rise of the hedge fund and investor activism. That fact, 
however, should not mean that we only approach the problem through a 
single, comprehensive fix. In fact, as I argue above, there are many rea-
sons to adopt an incremental approach to the short-termism problem. 
Conclusion 
While directors are not required under their fiduciary duties to make 
decisions that yield short-term profits, the pressures on them to do just 
that are substantial and real. They are increasingly being pressured by 
individual shareholders, who claim to simply be seeking value for all 
shareholders, to make decisions that do in fact deliver value to share-
holders—but only in the short-term. They are also influenced by the 
short-term agendas of executives, who receive lavish bonuses upon the 
generation of short-term profits. The effect of many of these decisions 
has been to cut off a firm’s source of long-term cash flows and to ignore 
long-term risks. The current economic crisis reveals not only the devas-
tating impact on specific businesses of this excessive focus on the short-
term, but also the disastrous impact on the entire U.S. economy and citi-
zenry of this short-termism plague. While no single measure can be 
expected to fix the short-termism problem, we certainly should not sit 
idly by while companies continue to collapse, employees continue to 
lose jobs, and investors continue to lose their investments due to prior 
short-sighted decisions. As the new administration starts to consider how 
to fix the problem of short-termism, so, too, should the Delaware courts, 
which enforce directors’ oversight and management responsibilities. 
They should, in my view, lead the charge, not by implementing a sweep-
ing reform, but by simply eliminating  
unnecessary discretion as to the time period over which corporations 
should seek to achieve profitability. 
                                                     
280. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
